Broad-Form Submission of Jury Questions and the Standard of Review by Dorsaneo, William V., III
SMU Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 3 Article 4
1993
Broad-Form Submission of Jury Questions and the
Standard of Review
William V. Dorsaneo III
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law, wdorsane@mail.smu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
William V. Dorsaneo III, Broad-Form Submission of Jury Questions and the Standard of Review, 46 SMU L. Rev. 601 (1993)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol46/iss3/4
BROAD-FORM SUBMISSION OF JURY
QUESTIONS AND THE STANDARD
OF REVIEW
William V Dorsaneo, III*
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 603
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE ARTICLE .................. 603
B. STRUCTURE OF CURRENT CHARGE RULES ............... 603
II. BROAD-FORM SUBMISSION OF JURY QUESTIONS ..... 604
A. EVOLUTION OF TEXAS CHARGE PRACTICE ............... 604
1. Early Texas Practice ................................. 604
2. 1913 to 1973: The "Distinctly and
Separately" Approach ................................ 606
3. Alternative Methods of Submission: 1973
Amendments to Rule 277 ............................ 607
4. The Supreme Court's Preference for Broad-Form
Questions ........................................... 608
5. Broad-Form Submission Made Mandatory:
The 1988 Amendments ............................... 609
B. INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS CONCERNING MANDATORY
BROAD-FORM SUBMISSION .............................. 610
1. May Broad-Form Submissions Submit Mixed Questions
of Law and Fact? .................................... 610
2. Does Rule 277 Require One "Broad-Form"
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law.
B.A., 1967, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1970, University of Texas. A member of Phi
Beta Kappa, Grand Chancellor of the Order of Chancellors, and a member of the Order of the
Coif, Professor Dorsaneo was a litigation specialist in Dallas after graduation from law school.
He is the principal author of the 20 volume TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE published by Matthew
Bender and the co-author of the TEXAS PRE-TRIAL LITIGATION, TEXAS TRIAL & APPELLATE
PRACTICE, and CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE casebooks. Professor Dor-
saneo is also a co-author and general editor of a 5 volume trial practice treatise entitled THE
TEXAS CIVIL TRIAL GUIDE, as well as a commentator for monthly publications such as the
TEXAS TORTS UPDATE and BAD FAITH LAW UPDATE. He is a frequent teacher on Texas
procedure at continuing legal education seminars and is a regular on the advanced appellate
practice program presented annually by the State Bar of Texas. He is Board certified in civil
appellate law and is an active member of the Committee on court rules and of the Advisory
Committee to the Texas Supreme Court. Professor Dorsaneo is also the chairperson of a Task
Force appointed by the Texas Supreme Court on Revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure and
a member of the American Law Institute. This article is derived in part from William V.
Dorsaneo III, Russell H. McMains & Margaret C. Jewell, The Submission of the Case to the
Jury: Back to the Past, presented at Texas State Bar Advanced Appellate Practice Course
(Oct. 1990).
The author would like to thank Matthew Ray for his assistance in the development of this
Article, as well as Sarah Duncan for her criticisms and comments.
SMU LAW REVIEW
Liability Question or May Broad-Form
Submissions Be Made Up of More Than One
Liability Question? ................................... 614
3. Is the Submission of More Than One Liability
Question Reversible Error? ........................... 617
4. Should or When Should Multiple Legal Theories Be
Included in One Broad-Form Question? ............... 620
5. What is the Appropriate Standard of Review
in Multiple Theory Cases? ............................ 626
a. Texas Cases Addressing the Standard
for Reviewing Broad-Form Liability
Subm issions ...................................... 627
b. Texas Cases Addressing the Standard
for Reviewing Broad-Form Damage
Subm issions ...................................... 629
C. SHOULD THE FLAWED THEORY PROBLEM BE TREATED
As H ARMLESS? .........................................  634
D. PARTICULAR TYPES OF "COMPLEX" CASES .............. 637
1. Premises Liability Cases .............................. 637
2. Submission of DTPA Claims .......................... 640
3. Submission of Insurance Bad Faith Cases ............. 642
a. Two Roads to Recovery .......................... 642
b. DTPA Grounded Claims ......................... 642
c. Common Law Duty of Good Faith and Fair
D ealing .......................................... 642
d. The "Stowers Doctrine" ......................... 644
III. INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFINITIONS .................... 644
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT ............................ 644
B. THE NEED FOR APPROPRIATE ACCOMPANYING
INSTRUCTIONS .......................................... 64 7
C. STANDARDS FOR EXPLANATORY INSTRUCTONS
AND D EFINITIONS ...................................... 648
1. Instruction Must be Proper ........................... 649
2. General Instruction About Law Is Improper ........... 649
3. Instruction Cannot Be a Comment on the
Evidence ................................... 649
4. Questions and Instructions that "Nudge" or
"Tilt" the Jury ...................................... 651
D. THE PROPER ROLE OF INSTRUCTIONS IN "COMPLEX"
C ASES .................................................. 653
1. Instructions in Statutory Negligence Cases ............. 653
2. Instructions in Insurance Bad Faith Cases ............. 654
a. Definition of the Duty of Good Faith and
Fair D ealing ..................................... 654
b. The "Stowers Doctrine"........................... 656




A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE ARTICLE
HE purpose of this article is to provide an analysis of the developing
law regarding the jury charge under Texas law, with particular em-
phasis upon the relationship of the feasibility of submitting liability
issues in one broad-form question to appellate standards of review. Since
September 1, 1973, when broad-form jury questions became appropriate in
negligence cases, Texas has been moving away from a very complex method
for submitting cases to juries in civil cases. Part of that process has involved
the reduction in the number of jury questions, a corresponding expansion in
the breadth of the questions submitted, and an increasing role for accompa-
nying instructions and definitions in enabling the jury to understand the
questions submitted and to render a verdict. By January 1, 1988, when the
submission of broad-form questions in jury cases was made mandatory,
rather than discretionary, problems that, prior to the 1988 amendments to
Rule 277,1 had been lurking below the surface, because of the discretionary
nature of broad-form submission, percolated to the surface, requiring Texas
courts to decide the proper method of broad-form submission in cases in-
volving multiple theories.
Although no Texas court decision has recognized it, the continuing devel-
opment of broad-form submission of jury cases is largely dependent upon
how appellate standards of review are applied to broad-form charges that
embrace multiple claims or defenses when one or more of the claims or de-
fenses are flawed as a matter of law or under the evidence. Recent cases
have intimated that some type of corrective action will be necessary if there
is a problem with one or more of the theories subsumed by one general ques-
tion. Logically then, a blind adherence to the broad-form submission may
make it difficult to attain the goals that the broad-form submission was in-
tended to achieve, namely to reduce appeals and retrials. A determination of
the proper breadth of a controlling question cannot be based upon some type
of Platonic adherence to the proper forms of things as determined in the
texture of the universe. It must be evaluated by reference to the concerns
that a sophisticated legal system has for the respective roles of the court and
jury.
B. STRUCTURE OF CURRENT CHARGE RULES
The essential elements of a proper charge are found in Rules 271 through
279 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 These nine rules set out the road
map of today's practice. The standard of review and definition of reversible
error are found in part in Rule 81(b)(1) of the Appellate Rules. 3 Rule 52 of
1. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277. See infra text accompanying notes 6-52 for discussion of the
history of the jury charge prior to 1988.
2. TEX. R. Civ. P. 271-79.
3. TEX. R. App. P. 81(b)(1).
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the Rules of Appellate Procedure,4 in conjunction with Rules 274 and 278 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure,5 describe the steps necessary to preserve a
complaint for appellate review.
II. BROAD-FORM SUBMISSION OF JURY QUESTIONS
A. EVOLUTION OF TEXAS CHARGE PRACTICE
1. Early Texas Practice
The earliest Texas practice6 recognized the use of a special verdict in the
form of narrative findings by the jury similar to the findings of fact made in
bench trials.7 From 1846 to 1913, both the general charge and special
charges and verdicts were authorized. In the general charge, the judge
stated the applicable law and it was "the province and duty of the jury to
apply the facts, permitted to go before them under the rulings of the court,
to the law as given them in the charge .... and directly and concretely
decide by their verdict who shall prevail in the suit." Due to its inherent
technicalities, the general charge was viewed as the source of numerous re-
versals. 9 If any theory in a general charge was insupportable factually, le-
gally, or procedurally, the entire case was reversed, even though the evidence
would support one or more of the non-defective theories.
In Lancaster v. Fitch,10 three theories of negligence were submitted in a
general charge. Although the court of appeals found that one of the theories
was flawed as a matter of law, it upheld the jury's verdict in favor of the
injured party on the grounds that the verdict and judgment were sustainable
under the other theories." The Texas Supreme Court rejected this ap-
4. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.
5. TEX. R. Civ. P. 274, 278.
6. For further discussion of the Texas jury charge practice prior to the 1973 amend-
ments, see Gus M. HODGES, SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION IN TEXAS (1959); Richard L. Col-
lier, Submission of Special Issues in Slip and Fall Cases, 5 BAYLOR L. REV. 161 (1953); J.B.
Dooley, Special Issues Under the New Rules, 20 TEX. L. REV. 32 (1941); Coleman Gay,
"Blindfolding" the Jury: Another View, 34 TEX. L. REV. 368 (1956); J.A. Gooch, Submission
to the Jury, 18 TEX. B.J. 155 (1955); Leon Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEX. L. REV. 273
(1955); Leon Green, Special Issues, 14 TEX. B.J. 521 (1951); Albert P. Jones, Special Issue
Submission, 15 TEX. B.J. 285 (1953); Albert P. Jones, Special Issue Submission, 16 TEX. B.J.
323 (1952); W. Page Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions-
Special Issue Submission in Texas, 33 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1954); William D. Masterson, Jr.,
Preparation and Submission of Special Issues in Texas, 6 Sw. L.J. 163 (1952); William 0. Neal
& William A. Poddick, Submission of Issues in Uncontrolled-Intersection Collision Cases in
Texas, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1965); A.R. Stout, Our Special Issue System, 36 TEX. L. REV. 44
(1957); Hon. Tom Suggs, Jury Submission Under the New Rules, 6 DALLAS B. SPEAKS 229
(1941).
7. See Claiborne v. Tanner, 18 Tex. 68, 73-76 (1856).
8. McFaddin v. Hebert, 15 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929), rev'd, 44 S.W.2d
938 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932).
9. See 3 Roy MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 12.39 (1970).
10. 246 S.W. 1015 (Tex. 1923); see also Tisdale v. Panhandle & S.F. Ry. Co., 228 S.W.
133, 137 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, judgm't adopted).
11. Lancaster v. Fitch, 239 S.W. 265, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1922), aff'd on
other grounds, 246 S.W. 1015, 1016 (Tex. 1923). The court of appeals explained the justifica-
tion for its method of analysis in this way:
If the evidence conclusively showed that the angle cock and its condition did not
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proach, reasoning that it was impossible to determine that the jury did not
find for the claimant upon the flawed theory alone. 12 The court explained
why the judgment could not be affirmed if one theory was invalid, even
though two were sustainable as follows:
This issue of negligence was specifically submitted to the jury by the
court as being of itself alone sufficient ground of recovery. We think it
is impossible to say that the jury did not find for... [the plaintiff] upon
this issue alone .... [The jury] may have found for ... [the plaintiff]
only on the issue that was improperly submitted. In order for courts to
be able to administer the law in such cases with reasonable certainty
and to lay down and maintain just and practical rules for determining
the rights of parties, it is necessary that the issues made and submitted
to juries, and upon which they are required to pass, be authorized and
supported by the law governing the case .... The charge authorizing
the jury to find for... [the plaintiff] ... upon the defective condition of
the angle cock alone would make it impossible to say that they found
for him upon the other two issues.13
By the end of the nineteenth century, due to legislative enactments and
court interpretation, submission of cases by special issues became mandatory
on the request of a party.1 4 One of the principal early obstacles to the use of
special issues was the rule that a verdict had to encompass all of the elements
of the claim.15 Even undisputed facts had to be found by the jury because
the trial court was statutorily precluded from rendering judgment if all facts
raised by the pleadings were not found, even if none of the evidence
presented raised a fact issue. In 1897, the Texas Supreme Court criticized
this dangerous aspect of special verdict practice. In Silliman v. Gano,
16
Chief Justice Gaines noted that the requirement that the special verdict in-
clude all findings necessary to support a judgment was too stringent.17 In
answer to this criticism, the Texas Legislature passed legislation mandating
that "an issue not submitted and not requested by a party . ..shall be
deemed as found by the court in such manner as to support the judgment." ' 8
In 1913, the Texas Legislature enacted the Special Issues Act,19 the prede-
cessor of what is presently Rule 277 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
of and by itself alone cause appellee the injury to the leg, then clearly a jury of
ordinarily sensible men would not find to the contrary, and the court could not
reasonably say that they did so find and found their verdict thereon. And we
think that the error complained of did not cause injury or the rendition of an
improper judgment.
Id. at 271.
12. 246 S.W. at 1016.
13. Id. at 1016-17.
14. See Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 50 S.W. 1012, 1013 (Tex. 1899).
15. See, e.g., Paschal v. Cushman, 26 Tex. 74, 75 (1861) ("This verdict is not sufficient to
sustain the decree, inasmuch as the fact is omitted that appellants had recovered a judgment,
etc., as alleged in the petition.").
16. 39 S.W. 559 (Tex. 1897).
17. Id. at 561-62.
18. Act approved June 18, 1897, 25th Leg., C.S., ch. 7, § 1, 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws 15, 15,
reprinted in 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1441, 1455 (1898).
19. Act of March 27, 1913, 33d Leg., R.S., ch. 59, § 1, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, repealed
by Act of May 12, 1939, 46th Leg., R.S., ch. 25, § 1, 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 201.
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It is commonly accepted that the legislation was enacted to provide an es-
cape from a general charge practice that had become unmanageable because
of "a gradual accumulation of instructions considered helpful to juries."'20
The new procedures mandated by the Special Issues Act required the use of
special issues. The statute included language requiring that "special issues
shall be submitted distinctly and separately, and without being intermingled
with each other, so that each issue may be answered by the jury sepa-
rately."' 21 This "distinctly and separately" requirement introduced a "sys-
tem of fractionalization of special issues far beyond that employed in any
other jurisdiction in the common-law world."'22
2. 1913 to 1973: The "Distinctly and Separately" Approach
In Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co. 23 the Texas Supreme Court mandated the
submission of each issue "distinctly and separately, avoiding all intermin-
gling" in negligence cases.24 Alexander Fox died as a result of injuries he
sustained while trying to operate a defective elevator. Although many spe-
cific acts of negligence had been alleged, the court submitted the following
single question concerning the decedent's contributory negligence:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Alexander Fox
was guilty of contributory negligence in his conduct in, around, or at
the elevator, or the shaft thereof, prior to or about the time he was
injured?25
The Texas Supreme Court rejected the trial court's submission of contribu-
tory negligence in broad-form, construing Article 1984a as requiring that
each separate factual theory be the subject of a separate question having a
separate answer.26
After Fox, the courts strictly enforced the requirement that issues be sub-
mitted "separately and distinctly" in negligence cases. In non-negligence
cases, however, broad-form submission was permitted. 27 In Roosth &
Genecov Production Co. v. White2 8 in which more than twenty specific acts
or omissions of negligence were alleged, the trial court submitted a broad
issue, over objection, that inquired whether the oil derrick, as it stood, was
defective at the time it was furnished by the defendant. 29 The Texas
Supreme Court, concluding that the "distinctly and separately" requirement
20. Lemos v. Montez, 680 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 1984).
21. Act of March 27, 1913, 33d Leg., R.S., ch. 59, § 1, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, repealed
by Act of May 12, 1939, 46th Leg., R.S., ch. 25, § 1, 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 201.
22. Jack Pope & William G. Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special Verdict System
for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577, 579 (1973).
23. 240 S.W. 517 (1922), overruled by Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 925
(Tex. 1981); see infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text for discussion of Burk Royalty.
24. Fox, 240 S.W. at 522.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 521-22.
27. See City of Houston v. Lurie, 224 S.W.2d 871, 876 (Tex. 1949) (condemnation ac-
tion); Howell v. Howell, 210 S.W.2d 978, 980 (Tex. 1948) (divorce action).
28. 262 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1953), overruled by Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911,
925 (Tex. 1981).
29. Id. at 100.
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had been violated, restricted the application of the specificity requirement to
negligence cases only, thus authorizing a dual system of issue submission
between negligence and non-negligence cases. 30 The Roosth court distin-
guished City of Houston v. Lurie3 1 and Howell v. Howell32 on the basis that
they were not negligence cases. 33 Texas thus developed a unique, technical,
and very complicated practice for negligence cases. Criticism of the Texas
charge practice prompted a major revision of the rules in 1973.
Before discussing the 1973 amendments, it is worth noting, for historical
purposes, that there was dissatisfaction with the requirement of separate and
distinct submission of factual theories at the time the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure were adopted in 1940. During the years 1939 and 1940, while the
original Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were being developed, Rules 277,
278 and 279 were drafted, revised in part, and repealed in part. As origi-
nally promulgated in 1940, Rule 277 contained the following language au-
thorizing disjunctive submission:
[T]he court may submit several issues disjunctively in the same question
where an affirmative finding on either of such issues would be sufficient
as an element for a basis of recovery or of defense. For example, the
court may inquire in one question whether the defendant has commit-
ted any one of several alleged acts of negligence. Alleged acts of con-
tributory negligence may likewise be grouped,3 4
This language was deleted by the 1941 amendment before the original rules
went into effect. 35 Had this language survived, the 1941 version of Rule 277
certainly would have created interpretive problems and opportunities like
the ones that Texas courts have encountered since 1973.36 However, be-
cause this language was deleted, the broad-form question did not become the
favored submission until 1973. Consequently, the "distinctly and sepa-
rately" requirement mandated by the Special Issues Act and the Texas
Supreme Court in Fox remained as the prominent method of submission
until September 1, 1973.
3. Alternative Methods of Submission: 1973 Amendments to Rule 277
Effective September 1, 1973, Rule 277 was amended. 37 After sixty years,
30. Id. at 104.
31. 224 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. 1949) (condemnation of buildings).
32. 210 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. 1948) (divorce).
33. Roosth, 262 S.W.2d at 103.
34. Rules of Practice and Procedure In Civil Actions, Rule 277 (Special Issues), 3 TEX. B.J.
525, 566 (1940).
35. Id.
36. It should also be noted that TEX. R. Civ. P. 278, "Failure to Submit Separately," was
also repealed before it became effective. It provided that "[t]he fact that an issue is multifari-
ous or duplicitous shall not constitute ground for reversal except where it affirmatively appears
from the record that the complaining party was prejudiced thereby."
37. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 historical note (Vernon 1976). For further discussion of the
Texas jury charge practice after the 1973 amendments, see Price Ainsworth & Mike C. Miller,
Removing the Blindfold: General Verdicts and Letting the Jury Know the Effects of Its Answers,
29 S. TEX. L.J. 233 (1987); Tom H. Davis & John R.W. Cracken, Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure Important Changes in 1988, 51 TEX. B.J. 668 (1988); J. Hadley Edgar, The Court's
Charge, in TEXAS ADVANCED PERSONAL INJURY LAW COURSE, pt. Q, at 1 (State Bar of
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it became apparent that the Texas charge practice was overloaded with gran-
ulated issues.38 The requirement that issues be submitted in separate and
distinct form was eliminated, but the method of special issue submission was
not completely abolished. Trial courts were given the discretion to submit
issues broadly with combined elements or to submit separate questions with
respect to each element. As a result of the 1973 amendments, the use of a
"Muckelroy" or "Stovall" charge that inquired simply "whose negligence, if
any .... proximately caused the collision ... ?" was acceptable, but discre-
tionary.39 The decision to submit broad-form questions remained within the
discretion of the trial judge until the 1988 amendments to Rule 277.40 The
1973 amendments to Rule 277 also eliminated the submission of "inferential
rebuttal" matters in issue or question form and authorized the submission of
"proper" explanatory instructions, rather than "necessary" ones.41
4. The Supreme Court's Preference for Broad-Form Questions
Following the 1973 amendments, the Texas Supreme Court interpreted
the meaning of "broad-form question" in a number of opinions, insisting
that Rule 277 means what it says and that it was designed to abolish the
"distinctly and separately" requirement. The court also made it clear that it
preferred the use of broad-form submissions. In Mobil Chemical Co. v.
Bell 42 the court stated that Rule 277 means that
... in an ordinary negligence case, where several specific acts of negli-
gence are alleged and evidence as to each is introduced, the submission
of a broad issue inquiring generally whether the defendant was negli-
Texas 1987); Earnest E. Figari, Jr. et al., Texas Civil Procedure Annual Survey of Texas Law,
44 Sw. L.J. 541, 573-75 (1990), 43 Sw. L.J. 485, 508 (1989), 42 Sw. L.J. 523, 551 (1988);
William W. Kilgarlin et al., Practicing Law in the "New Age": The 1988 Amendments to the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 TEX. TECH L. REV. 881, 912-16 (1988); Jack Pope & Wil-
liam G. Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special Verdict System for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J.
577 (1973); Jack Pope & William G. Lowerre, The State of the Special Verdict-1979, 11 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1 (1979); Kevin W. Saunders, A Logical Look at Special Issue Conflicts, 19 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 37 (1988); Regan W. Simpson, Jury Practice in Texas Civil Cases, 17 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 225 (1986); Garey B. Spradley, The Global Issue: Outlaw of the Special Issue
Practice, 18 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1980); B. Lee Ware, The Jury Charge, in ADVANCED CIVIL
TRIAL SHORT COURSE-1988, pt. m, at 1 (SMU School of Law 1988); R. Mike Borland,
Comment, Disjunctive Submission of Inferential Rebuttal Issues, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 147
(1981); Christopher Guisel, Note, Alternative and Inconsistent Theories of Recovery or Defense
May Be Submitted in a Single Broad Issue Without Mentioning All the Theories in the Jury
Charge: Island Recreational Development Corp. v. Republic of Texas Savings Association, 710
S. W.2d 551 (Tex. 1986), 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1017 (1987); Stewart Jay, Juror Agreement on
the Basis of Negligence, 8 REV. LITIG. 119 (1989); John J. Sampson, TDHS v. E.B., The Coup
de Grace for Special Issues, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 221 (1991).
38. See Lemos v. Montez, 680 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 1984).
39. See Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Muckelroy, 523 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [ist Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (upholding the original "Muckelroy" charge of "whose
negligence, if any, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence proximately caused the
collision made the basis of this suit?").
40. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277. See infra text accompanying notes 53-82 for discussion of 1988
amendments and interpretive problems arising from the change to mandatory broad-form
submissions.
41. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277. See infra text accompanying notes 296-362 for a discussion of
when an instruction is proper to enable the jury to render a verdict.
42. 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1974).
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gent is not error and is not subject to the objection that the single issue
inquires about several elements or issues.43
Similarly, in Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.44 the court
stressed that "Rule 277 was amended... for the specific purpose of permit-
ting simpler and broader submissions of controlling issues as a means of
halting the complex and artificial proliferation of narrow special issues."' 45
The court reinforced its position in Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls 46 in which
the court expressly overruled all of the cases decided before the 1973 amend-
ments.47 In Burk Royalty the jury was asked whether the defendant "failed
to follow approved safety practices for pulling wet tubing."' 48 In approving
the submission, the court explained that "[t]here was no need to ask separate
questions about each reason that defendant may have failed to do so. This
court has repeatedly written that Rule 277 will be applied as written."'49
Likewise, in Lemos v. Montez50 Justice Pope stated that since the 1973
amendment to Rule 277, "broad issues have been repeatedly approved by this
court as the correct method for jury submission."51 In a later opinion the
court instructed that "trial courts are permitted, and even urged, to submit
the controlling issues of a case in broad terms so as to simplify the jury's
chore." 52
5. Broad-Form Submission Made Mandatory: The 1988 Amendments
Rule 277 was amended, effective January 1, 1988, to provide that "broad-
form questions" "shall" be used "whenever feasible."'5 3 The Texas Supreme
Court also eliminated the language from Rule 277 permitting separate ques-
tions with respect to each element of a case at the discretion of the trial
court.54 Since the 1988 amendments, the Texas Supreme Court has reiter-
ated its preference for broad-form submission by holding that, unless ex-
traordinary circumstances exist, a court must submit issues broadly with
appropriate instructions and definitions as requested.55 In subsequent opin-
ions, however, the court seems to be reevaluating a strict interpretation of
the "broad-form" standard, indicating that at least in certain situations, a
less broad formulation of the charge may still be permissible.5 6 Whether the
43. Id. at 255.
44. 572 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1978).
45. Id. at 278.
46. 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).
47. Id. at 925.
48. Id. at 924.
49. Id.
50. 680 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1984).
51. Id. at 801 (emphasis added).
52. Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Texas Say. Ass'n, 710 S.W.2d 551, 555
(Tex. 1986).
53. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
54. Id.
55. Texas Dep't of Human Serv. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990).
56. See H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Warner, 845 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. 1992); Westgate Ltd. v.
State, 843 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1992); see also State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne,
838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992).
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door has been opened widely for a different formulation of the charge, or
whether it is merely ajar under extraordinary and limited circumstances, is
still unclear. Consequently, it is safe to state only that the broad-form sub-
mission is currently in a state of transition.
B. INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS CONCERNING MANDATORY
BROAD-FORM SUBMISSION
The 1988 amendments to Rule 277 mandating broad-form questions and
subsequent Texas Supreme Court decisions have presented the bench and
bar with a number of interpretive problems:
- May broad-form submissions submit mixed questions of law and
fact?
- Does Rule 277 require one "broad-form" liability question or may
broad-form submissions be made up of more than one liability
question?
- Is it reversible error to submit more than one liability question?
- Should or when should multiple legal theories be included in one
broad-form liability question?
- What is the appropriate standard of review in multiple theory
cases?
1. May Broad-Form Submissions Submit Mixed Questions of Law and
Fact?
It is well known to modem lawyers that questions of law are to be deter-
mined by the court and that the jury decides questions of fact. In fact, it is
hombook law that questions of law are to be decided by the court and that
they should not be submitted to the jury. 57 The submission of a question of
law is harmless, however, unless there is a showing of extrinsic prejudice. 58
In Texas, based on essentially the same policy of restricting the triers of fact
to factual questions, the same treatment has been traditionally accorded to
so-called "mixed questions" of law and fact.59 It is now clear, however, that
57. See C & C Partners v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 783 S.W.2d 707, 715 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
58. Alamo Carriage Serv. Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 768 S.W.2d 937, 942 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1989, no writ). As stated by Professor McDonald, "Absent some showing of
extraneous prejudice, the submission of a question of law is harmless: if it is answered as the
court should have decided, it can hardly damage; if it is answered to the contrary, the finding
would be immaterial and hence should be ignored." 3 Roy MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRAC-
TICE IN DISTRICT AND COUNTY COURTS, § 12.37.2 (rev. 1983).
59. See, e.g., Ryan Mortgage Investors v. Fleming-Wood, 650 S.W.2d 928, 932-33 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (although mixed question of law and fact requiring
jurors to interpret instruments and determine legal effect of contract should not be asked,
question that asked "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Ryan and GAMI
failed to perform their obligations in accordance with the Fleming-Wood Contract" was not
improper); Texas Imports v. Allday, 649 S.W.2d 730, 739 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (answers to questions that submit questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact
without appropriate explanatory instructions can form no basis for judgment for either party);
U.S. Life Title Co. v. Andreen, 644 S.W.2d 185, 193 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (in action to enforce repurchase agreement, submission of question to jury concerning
constructive notice was improper because question contained question of law or mixed law and
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the division of labor between the court and the jury has been changed by the
adoption of broad-form jury questions.
In Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co.,6° for instance, the Texas
Supreme Court approved the trial court's submission of broad-form jury
questions in a deceptive trade practices case. In the course of its opinion, the
high court expressly disapproved of the opinion of the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals which had held "that the issues submitted by the trial court which
followed closely the wording of the statute, asked legal questions rather than
... factual inquiries."'61 The Texas Supreme Court's opinion makes no at-
tempt to explain why the court disagreed with the court of appeals reason-
ing. 62 Although the court clearly approved a series of broad-form questions
submitted in a manner that closely resembled the statutory subsections of
the Deceptive Trade Practices Act which the plaintiff claimed the defendant
violated, 63 the opinion does not provide any guidance on whether a broader
form of submission - such as "Did the defendant commit a deceptive trade
practice?" or "Did the defendant violate the deceptive trade practices act?" -
would be proper. Brown teaches that strictly factual inquiries are not neces-
sary and that mixed questions of law and fact were entirely permissible
under the 1973 amendments to Rule 277.
Similarly in Castleberry v. Branscum,64 the trial court submitted the fol-
lowing question:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Texan Transfer,
Inc. was the alter ego of the defendant? 65
The question was accompanied by the following instruction:
You are instructed that a corporation may become an "alter ego" or
mere extension of the individual if the individual controls the corpora-
tion and conducts its business affairs without due regard for the sepa-
rate corporate nature of the business; or that such separate corporate
nature ceased to exist; or if the corporate assets are dealt with by the
individual as if owned by the individual; or if corporate formalities are
not adhered to by the corporation; or if the individual is using the cor-
porate entity as a sham to perpetrate fraud or to avoid personal
liability.66
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the question was too broad, reasoning
fact, but the error was harmless). See also Gus M. HODGES & T. RAY Guy, THE JURY
CHARGE IN TEXAS CIVIL LITIGATION § 2 (2d ed. 1968).
60. 601 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980).
61. Id. at 937.
62. As Chief Justice Guitard's opinion indicates, the Dallas Court believed that asking
jury questions in the language of the statute was improper because "[i]t is the function of the
court, rather than the jury, to apply the law to the facts and determine whether the representa-
tion found falls within any of the subdivisions at section 17.46(b)." American Transfer &
Storage Co. v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 284, 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979), rev'd, 601 S.W.2d
931 (Tex. 1980).
63. See infra text accompanying note 247 for the specific questions that were submitted by
the trial court.
64. 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
65. Id. at 275.
66. Id. at 275-76 (quoted only in part).
1992]
SMU LAW REVIEW
that "the ultimate issue of whether a corporation is the alter ego of an indi-
vidual or individuals is a question of law and, therefore, should not be sub-
mitted to the jury."'67 The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the
alter ego question is a factual one that is submitted properly in broad-form. 68
Controversies about the distinction between questions of law and ques-
tions of fact have been particularly common in commercial litigation. Con-
sider the following submission:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that under the con-
tract between the parties at the time of the exchange of properties, that
Norman Orr was not to pay a difference of $18,000 to Kenneth A.
Wirtz? 6 9
In Wirtz, this question was held to be improper on the basis that it asked the
jury a question of law about the legal effect of the contract, rather than a
factual question about the intent of the parties.70 Wirtz follows a pre-1983
line of cases condemning the inclusion of the phrase "under the contract" in
a jury question.71 But it now seems to be relatively clear that this method of
analysis has been rejected by a majority of the courts of appeals that have
considered the question.72
Undoubtedly, the most provocative decision on the question of
law/question of fact problem at the present time is the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Texas Department of Human Services v. E.B. 73 In E.B.,
the Texas Department of Human Services filed for termination of the parent-
child relationship between the parents and their two children. Under Sec-
tion 15.02 of the Family Code, the State was required to establish that at
least one of the following occurred:
(1) the parent had knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to
67. Branscum v. Castleberry, 695 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985), rev'd, 721
S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex. 1986).
68. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex. 1986).
69. Wirtz v. Orr, 533 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(emphasis added).
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. See, e.g., Kemper v. Police & Firemen's Ins. Ass'n, 48 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1932, holding approved), which held: "The phrase, 'as required by the terms of the con-
tract,' permitted the jury to construe the contract. The construction of a contract is a question
of law for the court, and not a question of fact for a jury." Id. at 255.
72. See National Fire Ins. v. Valero Energy, 777 S.W.2d 501, 506-07 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1989, no writ) (relying on Island Recreation Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Texas Sav.
Ass'n, 710 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1986), in rejecting argument that a question asking whether some
conduct or circumstances fall "under the terms of the contract" has the effect of asking an
improper law question); but see Garza v. Southland Corp., 836 S.W.2d 214, 219 (Tex.App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) ("The issue of whether a party 'breached a contract' is a
question of law rather than fact, and should not be submitted to the jury."); see also Rodgers v.
RAB Investments, Ltd., 816 S.W.2d 543, 551-52 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ) ("The
ultimate issue of whether a contract has been breached is a question of law for the court.
Riehn, 796 S.W.2d at 253 n.3. Questions of law should not be submitted to the jury. C & C
Partners, 783 S.W.2d at 715. In order to avoid submitting questions of law to the jury, the trial
court must examine the contract to determine what the contract requires of the parties. The
court should submit to the jury any disputed factual issues regarding failure of a party to
conform to the contract. Riehn, 796 S.W.2d at 253 n.3. When the jury determines the con-
duct, it is not making a decision of law ....)
73. 802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1990).
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remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or
emotional well-being of the child; or
(2) the parent had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child
with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or
emotional well-being of the child.74
In addition, the State was required to prove that termination of the parent-
child relationship would be in the best interest of the child. 75 As a matter of
statutory law, termination of parental rights is a two-step process, with the
first step involving some relatively specific acts of misconduct defined by
statute.
76
The trial court submitted one broad-form question to the jury:
Should the parent-child relationship between [the parent] and the child
[E.B.] be terminated?77
The jury answered "yes" and the trial court rendered judgment terminating
the parent-child relationship.78 The Austin Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, finding that the question required the jury, rather than the court,
to determine the ultimate legal issue of whether the parent-child relationship
should be terminated, and that allowing the jury to invade the proper role of
the trial court is a result not intended by Rule 277.79 Based on this reason-
ing process, the Austin court concluded that multiple jury questions, each of
which permitted the jury to determine the controlling fact issue, and upon
which the court would render judgment, should have been submitted.80
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, stating that the charge in parental
rights cases should be the same as in other civil cases. The court upheld the
question submitted by the trial court, which was taken from the Texas Pat-
tern Jury Charges, and the accompanying instructions, which were substan-
tially similar to those in the Texas Pattern Jury Charges.81 The court
explained:
In the 1988 amendments to Rule 277 this court said broad-form sub-
mission "shall" be used "whenever feasible" and eliminated trial court
discretion to submit separate questions with respect to each element of a
case. Rule 277 mandates broad form submissions "whenever feasible,"
74. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon 1986).
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. E.B., 802 S.W.2d at 648.
78. Id.
79. E.B. v. Texas Dep't of Human Services, 766 S.W.2d 387, 390 (Tex. App.-Austin
1989), rev'd, 802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1990).
80. Id. The court of appeals noted that a submission similar to that given in Howell v.
Howell, 210 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. 1948), would have been appropriate. E.B., 766 S.W.2d at 390.
In Howell, the Texas Supreme Court approved the following submission:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the acts or conduct of
the defendant toward the Plaintiff, if any, constituted such excesses, cruel treat-
ment or outrages of such a nature as to render their further living together as
husband and wife insupportable, as that term is hereinafter defined in this
charge?
Howell, 210 S.W.2d at 979.
81. E.R, 802 S.W.2d at 648-49; see 5 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY
CHARGES, PJC 218.01B (1992).
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that is, in any or every instance in which it is capable of being accom-
plished. . . . The rule unequivocally requires broad form submission
whenever feasible. Unless extraordinary circumstances exist, a court
must submit such broad form questions.82
Based on the foregoing decisions, it is clear that broad-form jury questions
drafted in compliance with current Rule 277 should not be strictly factual
inquiries asking about specific conduct. Under current practice a broad-
form question should be crafted as a mixed question that requires the jury to
apply the law to the facts. In other words, prior case law disapproving the
submission of mixed questions of law and fact is contrary to the requirement
that a broad-form question must be used whenever feasible. At some point,
a question that calls for the application of law to fact begins to look more
like a strictly legal inquiry to the factfinder. For example, a question that
asks the jury "Is the defendant liable?" could be considered a strictly legal
inquiry because it downplays the factual component of the analysis. But is
that question really very different from the broad-form question asked in
E.B.? I think not. The characterization of a question as a question of law
rather than as a question of fact does not really depend upon the breadth of
the question in some abstract sense. It is merely a convenient way to talk
about whether the question should be answered by the court or the jury for
policy reasons. It is a way to describe the outcome of the overall analysis
concerning the limits of broad-form submission, rather than a particularly
useful analytical tool in its own right.
2. Does Rule 277 Require One "Broad-form" Liability Question or May
Broad-form Submissions Be Made Up of More Than One
Liability Question?
In several cases, decided both before and after the 1988 amendments, it is
suggested that one liability question is required because this method of sub-
mission is "feasible". In Lemos v. Montez8 3 the Texas Supreme Court ap-
proved a form of submission that combined both the plaintiff's negligence
claims and the defendant's contributory negligence defenses in "one" broad-
form question containing two answer blanks as follows:
Whose negligence, if any, do you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence proximately caused the collision of December 27, 1979 made the
basis of this suit?
Yes No
(a) Alfred R. Montez
(b) Ignaciao Nat Arellano s.84
Similarly, in National Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh v. Valero En-
ergy Corp. ,85 the court of appeals approved the trial court's submission of the
following question:
82. E.B., 802 S.W.2d at 649.
83. 680 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1984).
84. Id. at 799; see also Southern Pac.. Co. v. Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1973)
(combining contributing negligence per se and excuse).
85. 777 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
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Did a loss occur which was covered and payable under the policy?8 6
When comparative apportionment is not part of the jury's job, it also may
be "feasible" to combine liability and damages in one broad-form question.
For example, in a contested false imprisonment case tried in Hidalgo
County,87 the trial court asked one question:
What amount of money, if any, if paid now in cash, do you find from a
preponderance of the evidence would reasonably compensate Olivia
Hernandez for damages directly resulting from the false imprisonment,
if any, on the occasion in question.88
These cases demonstrate that it is technically possible to draft an intelligi-
ble broad-form question to cover an entire case. The applicability of princi-
ples of comparative apportionment to a case would complicate the question
or accompanying instructions. However, even in this circumstance a one
question submission can be developed in virtually every case. Accordingly,
broad-form submission in one question is always feasible (i.e., possible).
This does not necessarily mean that there are no other problems.
The first modem Texas Supreme Court decision to identify serious
problems raised by broad-form submission is Island Recreational Develop-
ment Corp. v. Republic of Texas Savings Ass'n.89 In that action, the plaintiff,
a developer, sued because of the defendant bank's failure to fund a loan com-
mitment. The plaintiff specifically contended that a condition in the written
commitment had been waived and that it had performed everything it had
been asked to perform in accordance with the contract. The defendant ar-
gued, among other things, that the condition precedent to the performance
of the commitment had not been satisfied or waived. At trial, both parties
requested the court to submit a separate question that explicitly included the
plaintiff's waiver theory. Instead, one broad-form question was submitted:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that [Island] per-
formed their obligations under the Commitment Letter in question?9°
No accompanying instructions were submitted with the question, and no
objections were made to the charge on this ground. In its first opinion, the
Texas Supreme Court, in a sharply divided (5-4) decision, reversed the case
because the plaintiff failed to secure a specific jury finding on waiver. 9' On
rehearing, the court withdrew its prior opinion and approved the broad-form
question,92 holding that, although the word "waiver" did not appear in the
charge, the issue was subsumed in the one broad-form question. 93 The
court, after giving the history and the difficulties in gaining recognition for
the broad-form submission, stated:
86. Id. at 506.
87. Hernandez v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 652 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1983), overruled on
other grounds by Acord v. General Motors Corp., 669 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Tex. 1984).
88. Id. at 924 (emphasis added).
89. 710 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1986).
90. Id. at 554.
91. Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Texas Sav. Ass'n, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. 534
(July 3, 1985), withdrawn, 710 SW.2d 551 (Tex. 1986).




In the instant case the controlling issue, the only issue which would
authorize a recovery by Island, was whether Island had performed all of
the things required by Republic as conditions precedent so as to entitle
Island to enforce the commitment. This was precisely the single issue
the trial court chose to submit to the jury. We hold that in the instant
case the trial judge was following the policy this court has enunciated
concerning broad issue submissions. 94
The dissent in Island Recreational suggested the following submission to
resolve the waiver issue as an independent ground of defense:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that [plaintiff] per-
formed all of the obligations under the commitment letter which [de-
fendant] did not waive? You are instructed that waiver is defined as
intentionally giving up a known right. You are instructed that per-
formed means carrying out obligations as required by the contract. 95
The primary thrust of the dissent's reasoning was that the "waiver" the-
ory was not subsumed within the submitted jury question or in an appropri-
ate accompanying instruction.96 While this point is debatable, the dissent's
concern that the jury know clearly from reading the charge "what grounds
of recovery it may consider in reaching its verdict" 97 should be an important
factor regardless of the form of submission. Of equal significance is the dis-
sent's concern that "the trial court and the appellate court will know clearly
from reading the charge what grounds of recovery the jury considered, and
review the case accordingly, without speculation."'98
Thereafter, in Texas Department of Human Services v. E.B.,99 an opinion
that has been treated by one well-respected Texas legal scholar as the re-
quiem for the prior practice, 100 the Texas Supreme Court announced the
position that a broad-form question should be used unless "extraordinary
circumstances" exist. 101 As the majority explains "[b]road-form questions
reduce conflicting jury answers, thus reducing appeals and avoiding retrials.
Rule 277 expedites trials by simplifying the charge conference and making
questions easier for the jury to comprehend and answer."'10 2
In E.B., the court of appeals reasoned that the submission of the grounds
for termination of the parent-child relationship in one broad question con-
flicted with Rule 292, which requires a vote of the same ten jurors on each
submitted question. 103 The State therefore could obtain an affirmative an-
swer to the broad-form question without discharging the burden imposed by
94. Id.
95. Id. at 557 n. 1 (Spears, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 557-58.
97. Id. at 559.
98. Id.
99. 802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1990). See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
100. See John J. Sampson, TDHS v. E.B., The Coup de Grace for Special Issues, 23 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 221 (1991).
101. E.B., 802 S.W.2d at 649.
102. Id.
103. E.B. v. Texas Dep't of Human Servs., 766 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989),




the Texas Family Code that at least ten jurors conclude that the parent vio-
lated one or more of the grounds for termination set out in Section 15.02 and
that the same ten jurors find that termination is in the best interest of the
child.I°4 The broad-form question, as submitted, allowed the court to termi-
nate the mother's parental rights on the basis of five (and only five) jurors
concluding that she "placed the [child] in a dangerous situation" and five
(and only five) jurors concluding that she "engaged in dangerous
conduct." 0 5
After reading the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in the E.B. case, there is
no doubt about the court's preference for broad-form submission. There is
also no doubt that the court is not troubled by the court of appeals' concern
with the "ten jurors" problem. 10 6 In this connection, it may be important to
recognize that the court noted in E.B. that no complaint had been made
about the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's
termination findings.' 0 7 Accordingly, E.B. does not clarify whether broad-
form submission would still be considered feasible in retrospect if a review-
ing court determined that one or more of the alternate endangerment theo-
ries subsumed in a broad question was legally flawed or had no evidentiary
support.
3. Is the Submission of More Than One Liability Question Reversible
Error?
Despite the E.B. decision's strong suggestion to the contrary, it is now
clear that submission of more than one liability question does not ordinarily
constitute reversible error. The first appellate opinion to consider the prob-
lem is Sanchez v. Excelo Bldg. Maintenance.0 8 In that decision, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals addressed the discretion of the trial court to sub-
mit controlling fact issues in broad form in a slip and fall case. Justice Peep-
les' opinion explains that it would have been possible and feasible to submit
one broad liability question, provided that the charge included proper in-
structions and correct definitions, but found no reversible error in the trial
court's submission of the following two questions:
Question 1
Do you find that there was a condition in the ladies bathroom, created
104. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN § 15.02 (Vernon 1986).
105. E.B., 766 S.W.2d at 389.
106. E.B. appears to stand for the proposition that broad-form submission of a ground of
liability is permissible if ten jurors agree on the controlling question, e.g., whether the defend-
ant was negligent, even if the charge does not require that the same ten jurors agree on the
specific underlying factual theory. See E.B., 802 S.W.2d at 649 (since ten jurors agreed as to
the controlling question, i.e., that the mother's parental rights should be terminated because
the mother had endangered the child, it is immaterial that ten jurors may not have agreed on a
specific statutory basis of endangerment); see also TEX. R. Div. P. 226a (Rule 226a requires
instruction to jury that ten or more jurors must agree upon all answers made and to entire
verdict); James P. Wallace, Jury Issue Submission: Broad Issues Are Here To Stay A-15-16, in
STATE BAR OF TEXAS JURY ISSUE SUBMISSION INSTITUTE (1985).
107. E.B., 802 S.W.2d at 648.
108. 780 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
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by Excelo Building Maintenance, which created the unreasonable risk
of harm to Martha Sanchez?
Question 2
Whose negligence, if any, of the persons or corporations named below
proximately caused the occurrence in question?
a. Excelo Building Maintenance
b. Martha Sanchez' °9
The court held that Rule 277 did not require the trial court, on the pain of
reversal, to submit the liability elements in one question instead of two and
stated:
[Tihe two-question liability submission did not frustrate any of the pur-
poses of broad-form questions. We hold that the trial courts have at
least some discretion to determine the feasibility of broader submission,
and that the court did not err in submitting two reasonably broad liabil-
ity questions instead of one.' 10
Several years later, in a similar case in which the Texas Supreme Court
held that it is feasible to submit premises liability cases in one liability ques-
tion, the court considered, but did not resolve the question of whether a
granulated submission in violation of Rule 277 would constitute reversible
error. In Keetch v. Kroger Co. 1 I I the plaintiff claimed that Kroger was negli-
gent in creating a dangerous condition on its premises or in failing to dis-
cover the condition if it was created by someone else, for whose conduct
Kroger was not legally accountable. The trial court submitted the case in a
series of four separate jury questions. The plaintiff complained about the
multiple question form of submission of its premises condition theory. The
court rejected the plaintiff's argument. Although the court concluded that a
premises liability case can be submitted in one liability question accompa-
nied by appropriate instructions in a case involving an invitee," 2 the court
did not decide whether failure to submit the case in one liability question
was reversible error because the plaintiff "did not provide the trial judge
with any indication that her complaint was with the trial court's failure to
submit in broad form."' 1 3
Thereafter in H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Warner,"4 the Texas Supreme
Court directly addressed the question and decided that noncompliance with
109. Id. at 852 n.I.
110. Id. at 854.
111. 845 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1992).
112. The court approved PJC 66.04 Premises Liability - Plaintiff as Invitee, 3 STATE BAR
OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 66.04 (1990), which provides:
Did the negligence, if any, of those named below proximately cause the [occur-
rence] [injury] [occurrence or injury] in question?
Answer "yes" or "no"





113. Id. at 267.
114. 845 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. 1992).
[Vol. 46
BROAD-FORM JURY QUESTIONS
Rule 277's mandate for broad-form submission did not constitute harmful
error. In that case, the plaintiff slipped in a puddle of water, chicken blood,
and other fluids that had accumulated on the floor of an H.E.B. store. At
trial, the plaintiff alleged that the store was negligent in failing to adequately
maintain its floors in a safe condition, or in failing to pre-bag the chicken in a
manner that would have reduced the amount of chicken blood that dripped
on the store's floor. The trial court submitted the negligence claim in five
questions which included only the plaintiff's first theory of liability. The
plaintiff complained about the omission of its second theory, and about the
multiple question form of submission of its premises liability theory. The
court rejected the plaintiff's argument concerning the applicability of the
second negligence theory of liability, holding that the plaintiff's "only poten-
tial cause of action is limited to a premises liability theory, which was sub-
mitted by the trial court."' 115 The court then noted that the trial court
should have submitted the premises liability question in broad-form because
the plaintiff tendered a proper broad-form question with appropriate instruc-
tions. 16 Nevertheless, the court concluded that failure to submit the prem-
ises liability theory in broad-form did not constitute reversible error. 117 The
court explained:
Although submitted in granulated form, the jury questions contained
the proper elements of a premises liability action. Because the charge
fairly submitted to the jury the disputed issues of fact and because the
charge incorporated a correct legal standard for the jury to apply, we
hold that the trial court's refusal to submit Warner's tendered question
and instructions did not amount to harmful error."' 18
In a subsequent opinion, the Texas Supreme Court indicated that granu-
lated submissions may be harmful under limited circumstances. In Westgate
Ltd. v. State119 the government commenced condemnation proceedings
against a landowner who owned a tract of land needed in part for a proposed
highway expansion. After determining that the landowner could only re-
cover damages on its statutory condemnation claim, 120 the court addressed
the proper method of submission for the determination of statutory condem-
nation damages.' 2' The trial court submitted two separate questions in or-
der to establish the damages on the statutory condemnation claim.' 22 One
asked the value of the landowner's entire tract of land without considering
the highway project and the other asked the value of the landowner's re-
maining land not taken by the government. The Texas Supreme Court held




119. 843 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1992).
120. The landowner sought to recover damages for inverse condemnation under the tak-
ings clause of the Texas Constitution. See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text for dis-
cussion of the court's holding on this issue.




that although the trial court submitted the proper measure of damages,1 23
the damages "should have been submitted broadly as one question asking
the difference in the pre- and post-taking value, rather than two separate
questions." 124 Moreover, the trial court's failure to submit in broad-form
constituted harmful error because the granulated submission "produced a
demonstrably different result than if a broad-form question had been
used." 25 The court explained:
The difference in the before and after values found by the jury was
$2,524,000. This difference was within the permissible range of dam-
ages supported by the evidence, and would have stood as the damages if
a broad-form question had been given. However, the trial court, exam-
ining the jury's before-taking and after-taking answers separately, deter-
mined that the before-taking value was $210,000 lower than the
evidence would support, and accordingly increased the damages to
$2,734,000. The trial court's failure to submit in broad form thus in-
creased the damages on the statutory condemnation claim by $210,000,
and constituted harmful error.' 26
Although holding that the trial court committed harmful error in this
case, the court noted that "[iun many cases, the failure to submit questions in
broad-form will not be reversible error."'127 After Warner and Westgate, it is
clear that the court is retreating from an absolute broad-form submission
requirement by reference to principles of harmless error. As discussed be-
low, a further retreat from mandatory broad-form submission of liability
may be preferable in many cases involving multiple legal theories to avoid
other problems that could constitute reversible error. 28
4. Should or When Should Multiple Legal Theories Be Included in One
Broad-Form Question?
Problems of broad-form submission are particularly acute in cases that are
tried on multiple legal theories. Must multiple theories of recovery be in-
cluded in one broad-form question? Can a more refined submission be used
to separate each legal theory into its own question?
The Texas Supreme Court has suggested recently that Rule 277 may not
necessarily require the submission of only one broad-form "liability" ques-
tion, but rather a multiple question submission may be allowed to avoid the
risk of reversal in multiple theory cases. In State Department of Highways
and Public Transportation v. Payne,'29 the plaintiff was injured when he fell
into a drainage ditch while stepping off a culvert that ran perpendicular to
and beneath a highway. The plaintiff filed suit against the State alleging that
the culvert was both a special defect and a premise defect and that the State
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 457.
126. Id. at 457-58.
127. Id. at 458.
128. See infra notes 129-223 and accompanying text.
129. 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992).
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had knowledge of the alleged defect and he did not. The State answered that
the culvert was not a defect of any kind. Alternatively, the State asserted
that the culvert was not a special defect and that under the provisions of the
Tort Claims Act,130 even if a premise defect existed, the State owed Payne
the limited duty that a private landowner owes a licensee, i.e., the duty to
use "ordinary care either to warn a licensee of, or to make reasonably safe, a
dangerous condition of which the owner is aware and the licensee is not."'131
The trial court submitted two questions to the jury about liability. The
first asked:
Did the negligence, if any, of the below named parties proximately
cause the occurrence in question? 132
The second question inquired about the comparative negligence of the par-
ties. The questions submitted were accompanied by extensive definitions in-
cluding a legal description of the duty owed by the State where a special
defect exists.' 33 The court of appeals held that the trial court's refusal to
submit a jury question regarding the existence of a dangerous condition was
proper because the instructions required the jury to find that a dangerous
condition existed in order to find negligence.134 The trial court also refused
to submit the following question: "Do you find . . . that [Mr.Payne] had
actual knowledge that the culvert was at the location in question . . . ?,3
The court of appeals held that because this was a "special defect" case, the
plaintiff's knowledge was relevant only to the issue of his contributory negli-
gence, and because a contributory negligence question was submitted, the
trial court did not err in refusing to submit the question.' 3 6
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the culvert was not a
special defect, as determined by the lower courts, but rather a premise de-
130. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.022(a) (Vernon 1986).
131. Payne, 838 S.W.2d at 237.
132. State Dept. of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 781 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1989), rev'd, 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992).
133. The trial court gave the jury the following instructions:
"GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY": A governmental unit in the state is lia-
ble for personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible
personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private per-
son, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.
"DUTY OWED: SPECIAL DEFECT": Where there is a special defect such
as an excavation or obstruction on or adjacent to a highway, road, or street or
where there is the absence or malfunction of a traffic sign, signal or warning
device that is required by law, the governmental unit owes to the plaintiff a duty
to warn of such special defect.
The duty owed is a duty to use ordinary care to either warn of a dangerous
condition or to make such dangerous condition reasonably safe, provided the
governmental unit had knowledge of the dangerous condition, or through the
exercise of ordinary care, should have had knowledge of the dangerous condi-
tion.
"DANGEROUS CONDITION" means a condition other than normally
connected with the use of the roadway, excavation or obstruction, and a person
using ordinary care could not encounter such condition with safety.
Payne, 781 S.W.2d at 320.
134. Id. at 321.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 321-22.
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fect. 137 The majority then concluded that the plaintiff failed to meet his
burden to prevail on a premise defect theory, because he failed to obtain a
finding that he lacked knowledge of the culvert.' 38 The majority explained
its decision in the following terms:
The trial court's refusal to ask the question requested by the State con-
stituted a clear refusal to submit a premise defect theory to the jury.
We do not suggest ... that the trial court should have submitted the
case to the jury on specific questions rather than broad-form questions,
as required by Rule 277, TEX. R. Civ. P. The issue is not whether the
trial court should have asked the jury the specific question requested by
the State; rather, the issue is whether the State's request called the trial
court's attention to the State's complaint that no premise liability the-
ory was submitted to the jury sufficiently to preserve the complaint for
appeal .... The request not only objects to the omission of the theory,
it suggests the missing language necessary to correct the omission. The
trial court should have included the missing element in its broad-form
submission in an appropriate manner. ... Payne was not entitled to
recover on his special defect theory as a matter of law. To prevail on
his premise defect theory, Payne was required to obtain a finding that
he lacked knowledge of the culvert. This element of his claim was not
included in the broad-form charge which the trial court submitted to
the jury .... Thus, the verdict does not support a judgment in Payne's
favor. 139
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Mauzy accused the majority of ignoring
the policy concerns underlying the requirement of broad-form submission by
stating that "under settled law, the trial court would have erred in submit-
ting" the specific question requested by the state. 140 Based on Justice Cook's
opinion in E.B, Justice Mauzy explained that broad-form submission
reduces conflicting jury answers, thus reducing appeals and avoiding retrials.
Under this method of reasoning, if an instruction is defective, the proper
remedy is to correct the instruction, not to submit additional jury questions
that will "muddle the charge and foster conflicting jury answers, increasing
the likelihood of appeal and retrial." 14' Although Justice Mauzy's accusa-
tion begs the question somewhat because the majority did not suggest that
the specific question be included as a separate submission, rather than as an
instruction, the dissent does attempt to grapple with the problem of submit-
ting multiple legal theories in a broad-form charge. It may be important to
recognize that in these types of cases, broad-form submission may be inap-
propriate simply because one of the theories embraced in the charge is inva-
lid. In Payne because the special defect theory was not available under
controlling legal principles, the failure of the trial judge to modify the charge
required reversal. Would the result differ if both the special defect and
premise theories were covered in one broad-form submission? I doubt it.
137. 838 S.W.2d at 238-39.
138. Id. at 241.
139. Id. at 239-41 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
140. Id. at 241-43 (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 243.
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Another premises liability case, Keetch v. Kroger Co.,1 4 2 also presents the
problem of how feasible it is to submit such an action in broad form. In that
case, the plaintiff claimed that Kroger was negligent in creating a dangerous
condition on its premises or in failing to discover the condition if it was
created by someone else, for whose conduct Kroger was not legally account-
able. The trial court submitted the case in a series of four separate jury
questions that embraced only one of the plaintiff's liability theories. The
plaintiff complained about the omission of its "negligent activity" theory and
about the multiple question form of submission of its premises condition
theory. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument about the applicability of
the negligent activity theory143 and concluded that a premises liability case
can be submitted in one liability question accompanied by appropriate in-
structions in a case involving an invitee. 44 Nonetheless, the court did not
decide whether failure to submit the case in one liability question was revers-
ible error because the plaintiff "did not provide the trial judge with any indi-
cation that her complaint was with the trial court's failure to submit in
broad-form."145
Payne, Keetch and Warner do not provide clear guidance on whether mul-
tiple legal theories should be submitted in one broad-form liability question,
or on the proper standard of review when a broad-form question encom-
passes more than one theory of recovery but there is a problem with one of
the theories under the law or the evidence. However, each of the cases sug-
gests that if there is a problem with one or more of the legal theories sub-
sumed in the general question, some type of corrective action will be
necessary. 14 6
Two other recent Texas Supreme Court decisions do demonstrate that
when a broad-form submission allows a jury to decide the case on the basis
of a theory that is legally flawed or that has no support in the probative
evidence, reversal is required if the complaint is properly preserved. In Reli-
gious of the Sacred Heart v. City of Houston,147 the court was presented with
the substantive issue of whether the substitute facilities doctrine entitled an
owner of a private school to compensation in a condemnation case measured
142. 845 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1992).
143. Id. at 264.
144. Id. at 267. The Court approved PJC 66.04 Premises Liability - Plaintiff Is Invitee, 3
STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PIC 66.04 (1990), which provides:
Did the negligence, if any, of those named below proximately cause the [occur-
rence] [injury] [occurrence or injury] in question?
Answer "yes" or "no"
for each of the
following:
Don Davis: ____ .
Paul Payne:
Id.
145. Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 267.
146. Although it is arguable that premises liability cases are in an exceptional category, it is
more sensible to recognize that not only has the broad-form submission controversy not been
concluded, but that the Texas Supreme Court is currently developing the proper application of
Rule 277 to complex cases in the context of premises liability litigation.
147. 836 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. 1992).
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by the cost of purchasing substitute facilities. The trial court submitted the
case to the jury on a single question:
What do you find from a preponderance of the evidence was the reason-
able cost on February 18, 1988, of land, if any, reasonably necessary to
restore the remaining land and improvements at Duchesne Academy to
substantially the same function and use that existed at Duchesne Acad-
emy before the City's taking of 1.479 acres of land and improvements
thereon for construction and use of Chimney Rock Road?148
The condemnor objected to the charge on the basis that the substitute facili-
ties doctrine was included in the broad-form submission. 149 Based on the
court's substantive holding that the doctrine did not apply to a private land-
owner, the court held that the condemnor's objection to the submission of a
jury question that embraced the invalid theory should have been sus-
tained. 150 As a result, the court of appeals' reversal of the trial court's judg-
ment was affirmed. 151 Although the Texas Supreme Court's opinion does
not expressly articulate the principles of appellate review espoused in this
article, it is clear that the court applied them. The inclusion of a theory in
the charge that was legally invalid caused the reversal of the trial court's
judgment.
In dissent, Justice Gonzalez argued that the court should have upheld the
jury verdict as a proper broad-form submission on the topic of just compen-
sation.' 5 2 He reasoned that "because the court's broad form submission did
not prescribe what basis-whether substitute facilities, cost to cure, or mar-
ket value-the jury should use to reach its result..., the court of appeals
erred in reversing the trial court's judgment based on the invalidity of the
substitute facilities doctrine."' 53 It is implicit in Justice Gonzalez's opinion
that the inclusion of an invalid legal theory in a broad-form submission of
multiple theories should not be a basis for reversal of the trial court's judg-
ment. By the same token, it is implicit in the majority opinion that it should
be reversible error when it cannot be determined whether the trier of fact
based its verdict on the improper ground.
The second case is another condemnation case that also addresses the
problem of the submission of a multiple theory case in one broad-form ques-
tion. In Westgate Ltd. v. State, 154 the court determined that a landowner
148. Id. at 614.
149. Id. at 618.
150. Id. at 607.
151. Id. The court concluded that the condemnor did not have the burden to request the
submission of a correct alternative measure of compensation because the question as submitted
was defective in that it included the substitute facilities doctrine. Id. at 612-13.
152. Id. at 630 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
153. Id. Justice Gonzalez's reasoning process, which seems odd on its face, is actually
more complex than it first appears. As his dissent also explains, the parties apparently tried
the case on the basis of a "collective goal of restoring the school to its original pre-taking
utility." Id. But the parties differed on what was necessary to accomplish this objective under
the evidence. Under this method of analysis, the jury submission could be considered as a
broad-form question that asked the jury "what amount would justly make [the private school]
whole?" Id.
154. 843 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1992).
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could not recover damages in an inverse condemnation case under the tak-
ings clause' 55 where the government has not physically appropriated, denied
access to, or otherwise directly restricted the use of the landowner's prop-
erty. 156 In that action, the landowner may have pleaded two alternative
legal theories in support of its claim for damages. First, the landowner could
have pleaded that the government acted in an unreasonable manner in fail-
ing to warn it of the highway construction project and in delaying the com-
mencement of condemnation proceedings. Alternatively, it may have
pleaded that the government acted in bad faith to cause economic damage to
the landowner. 5 7 Although the majority opinion and the dissent disagree
on this point, the majority determined that the bad faith claim was not in-
cluded in the jury charge because Westgate did not request its submission. 58
Provocatively, the court noted the following with respect to the inclusion of
both theories in one broad-form jury submission.
Westgate could have requested jury instructions on bad faith and negli-
gence. Although we adhere to the principles of broad-form submission,
see Texas Department of Human Services v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649
(Tex. 1990), TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 is not absolute; it mandates broad-
form submission "whenever feasible." Submitting alternative liability
standards when the governing law is unsettled might very well be a situ-
ation where broad-form submission is not feasible.' 5 9
Although the settled or unsettled character of the law that is included in the
jury charge probably should make very little difference to a reviewing court
if the law becomes settled in such a way that all of the alternative theories
are validated under the law and the evidence on appeal, the inclusion of an
invalid theory in one broad-form submission may make a large difference. 160
If E.B. is interpreted as a multiple legal theory case and if its dicta is taken
literally, it would appear that a broad-form question is required to embrace
multiple theories.161 Under this analysis, in a case involving three liability
theories the jury might be asked, "Do you find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant's conduct was negligent or fraudulent or a
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing?" But subsequent decisions
155. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
156. Westgate, 843 S.W.2d at 452.
157. Westgate claimed in its answer and counterclaim that:
The Condemnees told the City and State on numerous occasions that the
threatened condemnation was destroying their ability to lease their shopping
center to prospective tenants. In spite of this knowledge, the Condemnors con-
tinued to fail and refuse to condemn the premises, to compensate the Con-
demnees, or to otherwise act to mitigate Condemned's losses .... This [conduct]
was undertaken by the Condemnors deliberately and with full knowledge of the
injuries being inflicted on these Cross-Plaintiffs and in conscious and contemptu-
ous disregard for the rights and interests of these litigants.
Id. at 455 n.5.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 456 n.6.
160. Of course, because of the "ten jurors" problem, that EB. did not credit, it may still be
argued that it is not feasible to submit well-established multiple, legal theories in broad-form.
161. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text for discussion of Texas Dep't of Human
Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1990).
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suggest that a more refined formulation is at least permissible, such that the
different legal theories could be submitted with each theory having its own
"broad-form" question. 162 Although the "ten jurors" problem did not
trouble the court in E.B., would the court take the same position if five ju-
rors believed the defendant was negligent, but not otherwise culpable, and
five jurors believed there was fraud, but no negligence or other misconduct?
The "ten jurors" problem takes on an entirely different dimension when
the case involves multiple legal theories as distinguished from multiple fac-
tual theories that are subsumed within one cause of action. Imposing liabil-
ity for negligence when five jurors believe that the defendant was negligent in
his speed, but not otherwise negligent, and five other jurors believe that the
defendant was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout but not other-
wise, is vastly different from imposing liability in tort because ten jurors in
the aggregate believe that some type of tort occurred. The problem is even
more striking when a single broad-form question covers both tort and con-
tract theories of recovery.
Finally, even if the "ten jurors" problem is not considered a significant
impediment in multiple theory cases, should Texas courts be troubled by a
broad-form question embracing multiple theories, if one of the theories was
improper under the law or the evidence? On the basis of the Texas Supreme
Court decisions after EB., it appears that when the incorporation of multi-
ple theories of liability in a general form of submission produces a verdict
that cannot be analyzed and reviewed on appeal without presuming that a
problem under the applicable law or the evidence did not contribute to the
result, reversal should be required when that presumption is not reasonable
because of the nature of the problem.
5. What Is the Appropriate Standard of Review in Multiple Theory Cases?
In determining how to deal with multi-theory cases, the impact of the
review process and the added ease or difficulty of finding reversible error due
to broad-form submission should be an important consideration. Specifi-
cally, before the broad-form controversy can be put to rest, the court must
decide what effect does (or should) the review process have on the decision
to submit a multiple theory case in one jury question? The threshold issue
should be whether the case must be reversed when a broad-form question,
encompassing multiple theories of liability, is given to the jury such that it is
not possible to determine whether the jury may have decided the case on a
ground of recovery or defense that is insupportable under the law or the
evidence. Should the problem be ignored on appeal by assuming that the
jury was not affected by it or should an appellate court refuse to assume that
the charge problem was inconsequential? Although some Texas cases have
162. See supra notes 129-45 and accompanying text for discussion of State Dep't of High-
ways and Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1992) and Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845
S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1992); see also supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text for discussion of
H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Warner, 845 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. 1992).
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recognized this problem, the issue has not been confronted squarely in the
context of evaluating broad-form submission of multiple legal theories.
a. Texas Cases Addressing the Standard for Reviewing Broad-Form
Liability Submissions
The Texas Supreme Court's opinion in E.B. provides some relatively
opaque guidance on the subject of the appropriate standard of review of ap-
pellate complaints about the jury charge. After stating that broad-form sub-
mission must be used except in "extraordinary circumstances," the court
announces that an "abuse of discretion" standard of review is applicable to
these complaints. 163
Of course, aside from the fact that there is a certain fundamental inconsis-
tency between these two positions, the court's particular treatment of the
standard of review leaves much to be desired because it is devoid of any
discernable legal content. Nonetheless, prior to the court's subsequent opin-
ions in Payne and Westgate, at a time when the court's focus was upon the
question of combining multiple factual theories into one broad-form ques-
tion, the Texas Supreme Court indirectly addressed the multiple theory
problem in Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway.'64 In Scott, the
plaintiff alleged multiple factual theories of recovery, most of which were not
supported by the evidence. The broad jury question (inquiring whether the
defendant was negligent) was submitted based upon a petition alleging four
specific acts of negligence, three of which were not supported by the evi-
dence. In addition, the plaintiff proved seven acts of negligence that were
not pleaded. The court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff because of the
"wide variance between the pleadings and unpled facts and circumstances
from which the jury could have inferred that the [Defendant] was
negligent."' 65
The court indicated that one broad-form question could have been used if
the trial court had properly drafted the question. The court gave the follow-
ing guidance:
Where multiple acts or omissions are alleged to be negligent .... the
trial court should inquire only about those which are raised by both the
pleadings and the evidence. Judicial compliance with this requirement
does not necessarily mean the submission of separate questions with re-
spect to each of such acts or omissions. On the contrary, compliance
under the two alternative broader methods of submission authorized in
Rule 277 can be accomplished very simply by listing the relevant acts or
omissions ... in a broad ultimate fact issue ... or in a checklist form.
Or, if the listing of the relevant acts or omissions in the broad ultimate
fact issue should be cumbersome, complicating, or otherwise undesir-
163. E.B., 802 S.W.2d at 649. The court provides: "The standard of review of the charge is
abuse of discretion, and abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court acts without
reference to any guiding principle." Id.
164. 572 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. 1978).
165. Id. at 277.
1992]
SMU LAW REVIEW
able, the requirement may be met by a complementary instruction along
the following lines:
In your determination of the above question you shall consider only
whether the railroad company was negligent in failing to have necessary
culverts or sluices at or near [the bridge] or [here listing any other acts
or omissions raised by the pleadings and the evidence upon the new
trial]. 166
In a later opinion, the Texas Supreme Court significantly limited Scott's
reach, downplaying the problem related to a variance between pleadings,
proof, and general form submissions.1 67 In Brown the court stated that
"[v]ariance between pleadings and proof has rarely been the source of harm-
ful error. To be reversible the variance must be substantial, misleading, con-
stitute surprise, and be a prejudicial departure from the pleadings."1 68 The
court added that the wide variance between the pleadings and proof in the
Scott case would rarely occur declaring that "[a] case could hardly be con-
ceived in which a variance could be wider than that found in Scott." 169
The Brown court indicated that a lack of evidence will not necessarily be
cause for reversal. 170 The court stated specifically that "we are not to be
understood as holding that a broad submission of an issue will be reversed
simply because one or more acts which contributed to the injury was not
particularly pleaded or proved."' 7' Although this language could be inter-
preted broadly to encompass a problem concerning one of the legal theories
contained within the literal terms of a broad-form question, it is obvious
from the multiple broad-form questions actually submitted by the trial court
in Brown that the court did not have a multiple legal theory submission in
one question in mind when the opinion was written. Perhaps the most sensi-
ble way to reconcile the court's statements in Brown with its subsequent
opinions in Payne and Westgate would be to embrace an approach that treats
multiple factual theories differently from multiple legal theories. It can be
argued with reason that jurors are perfectly capable of rejecting factual theo-
ries of liability that have no support in the evidence even when a broad-form
liability question authorizes an affirmative finding cn the basis of a factual
theory with the flawed evidentiary foundation. 172 Moreover, it is not as
offensive to impose liability for a breach of a particular legal duty on the
basis of the "ten jurors" problem in this situation.
166. Id. at 277-78 (emphasis added).
167. Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1015 (1980).
168. Id. at 937.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 938.
172. See generally, Lancaster v. Fitch, 239 S.W. 265, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1922), aff'd on other grounds, 246 S.W. 1015, 1016 (Tex. 1923); Griffin v. United States, 112 S.
Ct. 466, 474 (1991) ("Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular
theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law .... Quite the opposite is true,
however, when they have been left the option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory,
since jurors are well equipped to analyze the evidence. ). See supra notes 10-13 and
accompanying text for discussion of Lancaster.
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But when a single jury question encompasses multiple legal theories, the
analysis becomes more complex and the procedural choices are more diffi-
cult. Although it can also be argued that the jury is capable of rejecting a
legal theory that has no support in the evidence, it cannot sensibly be con-
tended that jurors are capable of distinguishing between valid legal theories
and invalid theories when both have support in the evidence. Accordingly,
when a jury question authorizes a jury to give an affirmative answer on the
basis of a theory that has no legal foundation, such as the "special defect"
theory in Payne, the "negligent activity" theory in Keetch or the flawed theo-
ries in Sacred Heart and Westgate, it should be presumed that the jury did
take the theory into account. This may be particularly true where the
"flawed" theory is in the forefront of a developing body of legal principles or
when it is otherwise of a beguiling character from the general public's untu-
tored legal perspective.
b. Texas Cases Addressing the Standard for Reviewing Broad-Form
Damage Submissions
Despite the fact that the Texas courts have not directly addressed the
flawed theory problem in the context of broad-form liability submissions,
several cases have discussed the appropriate standard of review in the con-
text of broad-form submissions on damages. In National Fire Ins. Co. v.
Valero Energy Corp.,173 the court submitted a broad-form damage question
in the following terms:
[w]hat was the amount of such loss, if any, payable under the policy? 174
The court of appeals held that the question was an example of proper
broad-form submission.1 75 However, despite the court's express holding
that the defendant's failure to request an explanatory instruction in substan-
tially correct wording waived its complaint about the failure of the trial
judge to charge the jury on the proper measure of damages, because the
generality of the damage inquiry permitted the jury to award damages for
business interruption loss, the trial court's judgment was reversed.1 76 The
court of appeals explained its reasoning in the following way:
Because the actual damage award of $10,000,000 (which was not sub-
mitted in separate items of damages) cannot be supported without an
inclusion of damages for business interruption loss, and since we have
found no evidence of business interruption loss in conformity with the
contract formula for calculating business loss, we reverse the judgment
of the trial court and remand the entire case for a new trial.1 77
In other words, the court of appeals concluded that the inclusion of a
theory of damages that had no support in the evidence in the general dam-
ages question required reversal. However, because it appears that the ten
173. 777 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
174. Id. at 506.
175. Id. at 508.




million dollar figure could not be sustained on the basis of evidence of other
compensable losses, there is no good reason to assume that the court of ap-
peals would have considered the no evidence problem to be harmful under
other circumstances. For example, if the jury could have reasonably found
that the plaintiff suffered ten million dollars in damages based on evidence of
other compensable losses, notwithstanding the business interruption loss
component, the award probably would have been upheld. In this situation,
it is ordinarily reasonable to presume that the jury reached its decision by
considering the damage elements having support in the evidence, rather than
on the basis of the unproven business interruption loss component. In other
words, even if there is no evidence or insufficient evidence of some element
or elements of damages pleaded, there is a principled and sensible basis for
concluding that there is no reversible error if the overall damage award is
not excessive.' 78
As discussed in the preceding section of this article, however, this is not
the case if the general damage submission rests upon a flawed theory of lia-
bility that is the potential basis for at least a part of the factfinder's omnibus
damage award. In Wingate v. Hajdik 179 the sole shareholder of a corpora-
tion sued a former shareholder for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and mis-
appropriation of assets. The trial court found for the plaintiff on all three
theories, but made a single award of damages predicated on multiple liability
findings. The Texas Supreme Court held that the misappropriation of assets
claim belonged to the corporation rather than the shareholder. 80 Conse-
quently, the claim was legally flawed because the shareholder was not enti-
tled to recover personally under the misappropriation theory. The court
held that since the trial court failed to segregate the damages resulting from
the misappropriation, the entire judgment must be reversed.' 8' The court
noted that "[h]ad the trial court segregated the damages resulting from [the
defendant's] misappropriation of corporate assets from the damages recover-
able on [the plaintiff's] personal causes of action, it would not be necessary
to reverse the entire judgment."'182 In this situation, as the court's opinion
suggests, it is more sensible to presume that the flawed legal theory did have
an impact upon the damages awarded, regardless of whether the factfinder is
178. See Curry v. Girard, 502 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, no
writ); see also Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 831 S.W.2d 81, 85 n.1 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992,
no writ) ("Insofar as the trial court failed to apportion actual damages among the four ele-
ments [of damages contained in the trial court's charge], a finding that the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support [one of these elements] serves to invalidate the jury's entire award for actual
damages ... because, at best, the record" does not support the overall damage award.); Baylor
Medical Plaza Servs. Corp. v. Kidd, 834 S.W.2d 69, 79 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ
denied) (holding that although the jury issue did not specify the amount of damages awarded
for each separate claim, there was legally and factually sufficient evidence as to one of the
damage elements and the jury could conceivably have awarded the entire amount on this ba-
sis); Victory v. State, 158 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Tex. 1940) (presumption that judge as trier of fact
based judgment on other evidence in the record).
179. 795 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1990).
180. Id. at 719.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 720.
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a judge or a jury.183
A general damage submission is also problematic if it is unclear from the
submission whether exemplary damages are supported by actual tort dam-
ages. In Lovelace v. Sabine Consolidated, Inc.,184 the plaintiff submitted
three theories of liability against the defendant joint venturer: breach of con-
tract, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiff submitted separate
liability questions on each of the three theories. However, the plaintiff re-
quested only one actual damages question predicated on a "yes" answer to
any liability question.'8 5 Further, the related instruction provided that ex-
emplary or punitive damages could be awarded if the jury found "actual
damages under one or more of the foregoing theories, and should further
find that [the defendant] acted willfully in causing actual injury or damages
to [the plaintiff]."' 8 6 The jury found liability on all three theories, actual
damages and punitive damages.
The court first noted that the plaintiff was required to prove tort damages,
not contractual damages, to sustain the punitive damages award. Under this
charge, there was no way to determine whether any actual damages were
assessed on the tort claims. The court opined that since one of the underly-
ing theories was not a tort theory and could not be a basis for an award of
exemplary damages, the exemplary damages award must be reversed.' 8 7
The court explained its holding in the following terms:
From a reading of the issues and instruction above it is clear that the
jury was not instructed to make the award of punitive damages contin-
gent upon a finding of wrongful conduct under all the theories ... it
was only conditioned upon a finding of "one or more of the foregoing
theories." The damages might very well have been awarded solely for
the breach of the joint venture agreements. Furthermore, since we can-
not determine from these special issues the dollar amount, if any, that
was awarded for the torts of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, we
cannot determine whether the punitive damages are reasonable in rela-
tion to the actual damages in tort.' 88
The court of appeals also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendant
183. It should be noted, however, that if separate liability findings were made and if each
liability theory had the same measure of actual damages, it would not be sensible to presume
that the damages awarded were somehow tainted by the inclusion of a flawed theory. If "all
roads lead to Rome" and it is clear that at least one of the proper routes was taken, the
problem has become entirely theoretical. But if an award of exemplary damages is predicated
on separate multiple liability findings, the problem may not be considered to be theoretical
because of the nature of these damages. In this situation, it is more sensible to presume that the
exemplary damages were increased because of the defendant's added culpability in the eyes of
the factfinder.
184. 733 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied).
185. The plaintiff requested the following actual damage question:
What sum of money, if any, if now paid in cash, do you find from a preponder-
ance of the evidence would fairly and reasonably compensate [the plaintiff], for
the monetary losses, if any, which were proximately caused by the conduct of
[the defendant] you have found above, if any?
Id. at 654.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 654-55.
188. Id. at 655.
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could not complain about the exemplary damages award because it failed to
object to the form of the damages issues by reasoning that "[a]n appellant
cannot be held accountable for the failure of an appellee to secure separate
jury findings upon which an accurate judgment could be based." 18 9
The Texas Supreme Court faced a similar problem in Wilgus v. Bond,19°
in which the court upheld a general damage verdict predicated on multiple
theories of liability even though it was not clear which damages related to
each theory, but the court did so because the defendant made no objection to
the damages question. 191 In Wilgus, the plaintiff recovered a jury verdict on
four theories: breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the tort duties of good faith
and fair dealing, conversion and fraud. The trial court then submitted the
following questions on damages:
What sum of money if paid now in cash would reasonably compensate
the Plaintiff, Wilgus & Bond, Inc., for its damages, if any? What sum of
money if paid now in cash would reasonably compensate Plaintiffs,
Dick and Peggy Wilgus, individually for their damages, if any?192
Based on the jury's answers to these questions, the court rendered judgment
for the plaintiffs for both actual and exemplary damages. In an unpublished
opinion, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had erred
by rendering judgment based on answers to damage questions that failed to
relate the elements of damage to specific liability theories of recovery. 193
Reversing the court of appeals, the Texas Supreme Court opined that the
defendant's failure to object to the unsegregated damage issues constituted a
waiver.194 The court stated that under those circumstances the trial court
did not commit "reversible error by submitting damage issues which did not
specifically relate the various elements of damages to the underlying theories
of recovery. '"195
The Texas Supreme Court has also held that a general damage submission
was problematic but that the defendant had waived any complaint about the
form of submission in American National Petroleum Co. v. Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Corp. 196 In that case, the plaintiffs sued a pipeline company
claiming breach of a claimed tort duty of good faith in the performance of a
contract together with a claim of tortious interference with a related con-
tract with a third party. The jury found for the plaintiffs on each of the
claims which were submitted in separate liability questions and awarded ac-
tual damages in response to a general damages question on the claimant's
189. Id. Although writ was denied in Lovelace, ultimately the Texas Supreme Court con-
cluded that a failure to object before the submission of the case to the jury about the court's
failure to segregate damages between the underlying theories of recovery would have waived
the complaint. See Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 368 (Tex. 1987)(by failing to object, defendant waived argument that damages question did not specifically
relate to particular grounds of recovery).
190. 730 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1987).
191. Id. at 672.
192. Id. at 671.
193. Id. at 672.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 798 S.W.2d 274, 278 (Tex. 1990).
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actual damages, plus sixteen million dollars in exemplary damages for the
pipeline company's "malicious" conduct.
The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the pipeline company had a
contractual obligation but did not have a tort duty of good faith and fair
dealing in the performance of the contract.1 97 Thus, the plaintiffs were lim-
ited to their tortious interference claim to sustain the punitive damages
award. The plaintiffs, however, failed to obtain an independent finding of
actual damages referable to that cause of action. In other words, the actual
damages found by the jury were not all referable to a tort theory that would
support an exemplary damages award. For this reason, the court of appeals
concluded that the failure to obtain a discrete finding of actual tort damages,
which is a prerequisite to the recovery of exemplary damages, required re-
versal of the trial court's judgment for exemplary damages.' 98
The plaintiffs attempted to argue that during the charge conference the
defendant waived the need for submission of an actual damages question
relating to the tortious interference claim. The court of appeals disagreed
with the plaintiffs' waiver argument and held that it was the plaintiffs' duty
"to allege, prove and secure jury findings not only on the existence but also
on the specific amount of actual damages sufficient to support the award of
exemplary damages. ' 199
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that
defense counsel waived any error concerning the nonsubmission of a sepa-
rate tort damages question for the tortious interference claim.2° ° The court
reasoned that the "failure to object to the omission of a tort damages ques-
tion as part of that cluster alone waived the requirement of submitting the
correct damages issue to the jury."' 20 1 It seems clear, however, that the court
would have viewed the matter differently if the defendant had not admitted
that the same damages were sustained under both the tortious interference
and good faith and fair dealing theories. The clear implication of the court's
opinion is that, absent waiver, the legal problem of treating the good faith
and fair dealing claim as a tort claim, rather than as a contract claim, could
not be ignored because the jury could have awarded some and perhaps all of
the compensatory damages, as contract rather than tort damages, thereby
making it difficult, if not impossible, for a reviewing court to determine
whether a reasonable relationship existed between the two awards.
These damage cases are perfectly compatible with the viewpoint expressed
above that jurors may be presumed capable of dealing with and discarding
theories that have no evidentiary support, but not more seriously flawed
broad-form submissions that embrace invalid grounds of recovery or
defense.
197. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. American Nat'l Petroleum, 763 S.W.2d 809,
820 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988), rev'd, 798 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1990).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 821.




C. SHOULD THE FLAWED THEORY PROBLEM BE
TREATED AS HARMLESS?
Regardless of whether the multiple theory problem is considered in the
context of multiple liability theories or in the context of the relationship of
particular liability theories to damage awards, the foregoing Texas cases
demonstrate that the problem of being unable to tell what role a flawed legal
theory played in the factfinder's analysis and award may require reversal.
The federal courts in this region and elsewhere have handled this question by
requiring a reversal if "the giving of an instruction has made it possible that
the jury may have found against a party on a ground for which there was no
evidence. '20 2 In one case, a police officer sued several city officers for civil
rights violations. The plaintiff alleged that he was dismissed due to his in-
volvement in constitutionally protected activities. The district court in-
structed the jury that it was to answer "yes" if it found "any one [of the three
listed activities] was a substantial motivating factor" in the decision to fire
the plaintiff.20 3
One of the three activities listed was not supported by the evidence. On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the verdict must be reversed because it
was not possible to determine whether the jury's verdict rested on the two
supported grounds or the one unsubstantiated claim.20 4 The court cited the
rule established by the United States Supreme Court in Zant v. Stephens20 5
as follows:
[A] general verdict must be set aside if the jury was instructed that it
could rely on any of two or more independent grounds, and one of those
grounds is insufficient, because the verdict may have rested exclusively on
the insufficient ground. The cases in which this rule has been applied all
involved general verdicts based on a record that left the reviewing court
uncertain as to the actual ground on which the jury's decision rested.20 6
In Dougherty v. Continental Oil Co. 207 the court observed that an interro-
gatory dependent on multiple theories is really no better than a general
verdict:
Such an interrogatory presents the same dilemma as a general verdict
202. Neubauer v. City of McAllen, Tex., 766 F.2d 1567, 1575 (5th Cir. 1985).
203. Id. at 1572 n.3.
204. Id. at 1576-77.
205. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
206. Neubauer, 766 F.2d at 1576 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also Sunkist
Growers v. Winkler & Smith Citrus Prod. Co., 320 U.S. 19, 29-30 (1962) (where one theory
upon which the general verdict may have rested was erroneous, the entire verdict must be
reversed because if "upon any one issue error was committed, either in admission of the evi-
dence or charge of the court, the verdict cannot be upheld"). Several cases have been reversed
on this basis. See e.g., Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir. 1980)
("[a]lthough plaintiff asserted several theories of recovery, and although the res ipsa loquitur
charge would relate to only one, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff...
[W]e, therefore, do not know on what basis the jury reached its verdict"); Vandercook & Son,
Inc. v. Thorpe, 344 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1965) (where case was submitted on both negligence and
implied warranty theories, but there was no evidence of negligence, reversal of judgment on
general verdict for plaintiff was required even if the jury could have properly found for plaintiff
on the warranty theory alone).
207. 579 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1978).
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submitted to the jury on two theories of law, one of which is incorrect.
Since we are unable to say whether the jury based its answer on a possi-
bly correct theory of law.., or an incorrect theory... we would have
no alternative but reversal. 20°
Not surprisingly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has taken the
same position. In Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies,2°9 claims
were made against Royal seeking to recover damages for alleged breaches of
warranties, fraud and tortious interference with business relations. The trial
judge submitted all of the theories to the jury in a general charge.2 10
Although the court of appeals was urged to apply the "two-issue" rule
adopted in Florida 211 and elsewhere, 21 2 it explained that it is well settled in
the circuit that if "the judge accepts a general verdict in a case containing
multiple issues, the verdict is immune to attack only as long as the evidence
under each count is sufficient to authorize the result. '2 13 Accordingly, be-
cause the trial court erroneously submitted several of the multiple claims,
the case was reversed and remanded for retrial.2 14
Federal procedural law does not, however, require an automatic reversal
when a verdict could have been based on a flawed theory. If the court of
appeals ". . . is reasonably certain that the jury was not significantly influ-
enced by issues erroneously submitted to it," reversal is not required.21 5 For
example, if the record as a whole shows that it would be unreasonable to
presume that the flawed theory affected the verdict, the case is not subject to
208. Id. at 960 n.2. See also Woods v. Sammisa Co., 873 F.2d 842, 849 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 110 S. Ct. 853 (1989) ("when two claims have been submitted to the jury, either on a
general verdict or... in a single interrogatory, a new trial may be required if one of the claims
was submitted erroneously unless the appellate court is reasonably certain that the jury was
not significantly influenced by issues erroneously submitted to it").
209. 719 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir. 1983).
210. Id. at 1098.
211. Under this rule, if a claimant does not request the separate submission of multiple
theories, an appellate court will not grant a new trial where the jury has rendered a general
verdict and the appellate court finds no error as to one of the theories on which the jury was
instructed. See Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough, 355 So.2d 1181, 1185-86 (Fla. 1977) ex-
plaining that the "two-issue" rule is a ". . . rule of policy, designed to limit the scope of
proceedings on review." The Florida Supreme Court also explains that
... the remedy is always in the hands of counsel. Counsel may simply request a
special verdict as to each count in the case... Had petitioners in the instant case
requested special verdicts and objected to submission of a general verdict form
to the jury, it would have been necessary for the [court of appeals] to determine
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the false imprisonment count as well as
the malicious prosecution count. If there was error as to either count, the dis-
trict court should then remand the case for a new trial as to both counts.
Hence, it is clear that the "two-issue" rule is very similar to the approach taken to damages
submissions under current Texas law as explained in the preceding section of this article.
212. The "two-issue" rule appears to have been adopted in a number of jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Berger v. Southern Pac. Co., 300 P.2d 170 (Cal. [1st App.] 1956); Harper v. Henry, 169
N.E.2d 20 (Ohio App. 1959); Larriva v. Widmer, 415 P.2d 424 (Ariz. 1966).
213. 719 F.2d at 1098.
214. Id. at 1107.
215. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1258 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980);
see also Braun v. Flynt, 731 F.2d 1205, 1206 (5th Cir. 1984); Collum v. Butler, 421 F.2d 1257,
1260 (7th Cir. 1970) ("To permit ... issues which occupied positions of... relative insignifi-
cance in the trial court to be treated now as so important as to make their submission to the




In the punitive damage context, uncertainty is tolerated hardly at all, as
seen, for example, in Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 217 The
Eighth Circuit determined that, under applicable law, three or four causes of
action underlying a single exemplary damage award were insufficient sup-
port for the award. 218
Recognizing that punitive damages are closely intertwined with assess-
ment of a defendant's conduct (since the determination includes considera-
tion of the nature, extent, and enormity of the wrong-doing, as well as the
motive actuating, and the degree of calculation involved, in the defendant's
conduct), the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the punitive damage award could
not stand without resolution in the charge of the precise conduct the jury
intended to punish and deter. Accordingly, the court held:
Because the punitive damage issue was submitted in the form of a gen-
eral verdict ... we cannot ascertain what conduct of [defendant] was
determined by the jury to merit punitive damages. Some or all of the
punitive damage award may have rested upon theories improperly sub-
mitted to the jury. Thus ... we have no alternative but to reverse the
punitive damage award and remand the issue to the district court.219
Of course, these problems do not exist if all of the claims in the general
charge are legally viable and sufficiently supported by the evidence. For ex-
ample, in Olney Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Trinity Banc Savings Ass'n,220 the
trial court posed a general question asking whether the defendant had en-
gaged in fraud or negligent misrepresentation. The court of appeals upheld
the question as proper because each claim was properly supported by the
evidence. 221
The development of a proper approach to the broad-form question issue
warrants a reconsideration of the potential problems associated with the
E.B. decision. The inclusion of multiple theories of liability in one broad-
form question presents significant problems in the administration of civil jus-
tice when one or more of the multiple theories is legally flawed or has no
support in the evidence. As explained above, the inclusion of invalid legal
theories has a strong potential for misleading the trier of fact and should give
rise to a presumption of harm, especially when the flawed theory has support
in the evidence. Under these circumstances and perhaps in other instances
when a reviewing court cannot be "reasonably certain" that the verdict was
not tainted by the inclusion of the flawed theory in the charge on the basis of
the entire record, reversal should be considered. The method of analysis
embraced by the Supreme Court of Texas in Island Recreational Develop-
216. Braun v. Flynt, 731 F.2d 1205, 1206 (5th Cir. 1984) (when there was no evidence of
invasion of privacy by "appropriation" and the "entire focus of Mrs. Braun's case was.., that
the publication of her picture created a false impression of her and damaged her reputation,"
inclusion of appropriation theory in broad-form submission did not constitute reversible error).
217. 871 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1988).
218. Id. at 1376.
219. Id.
220. 885 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1989).
221. Id. at 271.
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ment Corp. v. Republic of Texas Savings.222 should be applied to determine
whether the inclusion of the flawed theory in the broad-form submission is
reversible. As the Court explains:
To determine whether an alleged error in the jury charge is reversible,
the reviewing court must consider the pleadings of the parties, the evi-
dence presented at trial, and the charge in its entirety. Alleged error
will be deemed reversible only if, when viewed in the totality of these
circumstances, it amounted to such a denial of the rights of the com-
plaining party as was reasonably calculated and probably did cause the
rendition of an improper judgment. 223
Under this analysis, E.B. 's policy rationale for the required use of broad-
form questions, i.e., the avoidance of unnecessary appeals and retrials, will
be promoted, but not at the expense of persons who may have been held
liable on the basis of a flawed legal theory.
D. PARTICULAR TYPES OF "COMPLEX" CASES
The next section of this article surveys the reported case law concerning
broad-form submission of jury questions in a number of substantive areas
with a view toward demonstrating that broad-form submission is ordinarily
feasible even when the underlying law is complex and multifaceted. Of
course, the fact that a broad-form submission can be devised in complex
cases does not mean that it should be presumed that the inclusion of a flawed
theory probably did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment.
1. Premises Liability Cases
The principal reason why the broad-form submission in premises liability
cases grounded in negligence has been so controversial is that the law is
somewhat more complex in these cases than in other negligence actions.
Texas recognizes three categories of plaintiffs in premises liability cases. If
the basic liability elements of a slip and fall case are submitted in one broad
question, it must be made clear to the jury that the law in a slip and fall case
is more complicated than the law in a car wreck case. The essential elements
of an invitee's slip and fall case are:
1. Actual or constructive knowledge of some condition on the prem-
ises by the possessor of land;
2. That the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm;
3. That the possessor of the land did not exercise reasonable care to
reduce or eliminate the risk; and
4. That the failure to use such care proximately caused the plaintiff's
injuries. 224
A lesser degree of care is owed to trespassers and licensees. 225 As a matter of
substantive law, these plaintiffs are required to prove that they did not know
222. 710 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1986).
223. Id. at 555.
224. Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. 1983).
225. See State v. Tennison, 509 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex. 1974).
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about the dangerous condition and the premises owner had actual
knowledge. 226
Submissions in slip and fall cases have presented problems since broad-
form submission was adopted in negligence actions. In Hernandez v. Kroger,
Co. 227 the Texas Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, appeared to ap-
prove a type of granulated submission, as follows:
Question No. 1
Did The Kroger Co. know, or in using ordinary care should it have
known, that moisture would be tracked into the foyer of its stores caus-
ing an unreasonable risk of harm to its customers?
Question No. 2
On the occasion in question did The Kroger Co. fail to use ordinary
care to reduce or eliminate such risk by the use of absorbing floor rugs
in its foyer?
Question No. 3
Was such failure a proximate cause of injury to Lera Hernandez?
Question No. 4
On the occasion in question did The Kroger Co. fail to give such warn-
ing of such risk as would have been given by a person using ordinary
care?
Question No. 5
Was such failure a proximate cause of injury to Lera Hernandez?
The court held that the requested issues were in substantially the same form
as the essential elements of a slip and fall case as outlined in Corbin v.
Safeway Stories, Inc.2 2 8
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals followed the Hernandez holding in
Physicians & Surgeons General Hospital v. Koblizek Co. 229 Specifically, the
court of appeals held that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the
jury based upon general negligence principles, rather than the method of
submission set forth in Hernandez.230 The trial judge was required to ask a
specific, specialized question about whether the premises owner knew or
should have known about the dangerous condition because that was an es-
sential element of the plaintiffs' case. 231 Similarly, in Skaggs Alpha Beta,
Inc. v. Nabhan,232 the plaintiff sued a department store because of a blow to
the head delivered from a sign hanging over the meat counter. A broad-
form question, "[w]as the manner in which the defendant hung the sign neg-
ligence as herein defined?," and an inquiry as to proximate cause, together
with the usual definitions of negligence, ordinary care and proximate cause
were submitted. 233 The El Paso court, citing Koblizek, stated that "[i]t is
226. Id.
227. 711 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. 1986).
228. Id. at 4 (citing Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. 1983)).
229. 752 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
230. Id. at 659-60.
231. Id. at 660.
232. 808 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
233. Id. at 200.
[Vol. 46
BROAD-FORM JURY QUESTIONS
clear that cases involving liability for on premises activities are properly
charged as typical negligence cases."' 234 In Nabhan, the defendant actually
created the hazard as opposed to Koblizek, where a third party created the
hazard.
It is "feasible" (possible) to submit a slip and fall case to the jury as
follows:
Question
Whose negligence, if any, do you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence was a proximate cause of the occurrence made the basis of this
suit?
(a) Joe Foster Management Company
(b) Bill Henson
For example, in Prudential Insurance Co. ofAmerica v. Henson,235 the court
expressly approved the above one question submission of a slip and fall case,
accompanied by an instruction that stated the gist of the Corbin elements.236
This question is similar to the question recommended in Pattern Jury
Charge ("PJC") section 66.04.237 The recent decision in State Department
of Highways & Public Transportation v. Payne indicates that broad-form sub-
mission of premises liability cases is feasible, despite the complexity of the
substantive law.238 In Payne, the Texas Supreme Court held that it was re-
versible error to impose liability on a premise defect theory when a required
element of the claim was not included in the broad-form charge that the trial
court submitted to the jury.239 Furthermore, according to the PJC, the
following broad-form question would be proper in a premises liability case in
which the plaintiff was a licensee:
With respect to the condition of the premises, [Defendant] was negli-
gent if -
a. the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm, and
b. [Defendant] had actual knowledge of the danger, and
c. [Plaintiff] did not have actual knowledge of the danger, and
d. [Defendant] failed to adequately warn [Plaintiff] of the condition or
make that condition reasonably safe.
Answer "Yes" or "no" for each of the following:
[Defendant][Plaintiff]24°
The customized submission for a licensee case would be combined with the
standard definitions of negligence, ordinary care, and proximate cause.241
This method of addressing the legal complexity of a claim in the accompa-
nying definitions and instructions, rather than by the use of multiple ques-
234. Id. at 201.
235. 753 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, no writ).
236. Id. at 417.
237. 3 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 66.04 (2d ed. 1990).
238. 838 S.W. 2d 235, 239 (Tex. 1992). See supra notes 128-40 and accompanying text for
additional discussion of Payne.
239. Id. at 241.
240. 3 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 66.05 (2d ed. 1990).
241. Id. 66.05 cmt.
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tions is also illustrated by the Dallas court's opinion in Barham v. Turner
Construction Co. of Texas.242 In Barham, the plaintiff sued a general con-
tractor for the action of its subcontractor for a dangerous condition arising
out of the performance of certain work by the subcontractor. The trial court
defined negligence of the general contractor to mean "the failure to use ordi-
nary care in the exercise of its control, if any, over the details of the work
performed by [the subcontractor/plaintiff's employer]. '243
The trial court refused the plaintiff's tendered definition of negligence
found in the PJC and refused to submit the plaintiff's tendered issues inquir-
ing 1) whether the general contractor had a right to control the details of the
subcontractor's work and 2) whether the general contractor actually exer-
cised control. The plaintiff also complained that the definition of negligence
was an improper comment on the weight of the evidence because it excluded
consideration of the negligence of the general contractor in failing to furnish
safe materials, a safe work place and adequate inspection. On appeal, the
court upheld the submission, stating that the definition of negligence placed
the relevant issue before the jury.244
2. Submission of DTPA Claims
Broad-form submission has been used for years in DTPA actions. The
"laundry list" of section 17.46(b) of the DTPA contains twenty-three sub-
sections designed to prohibit specific types of unfair trade practices.245 If the
jury finds that one of the listed acts or practices occurred, it is an unlawful
deceptive trade practice as a matter of law. In Brown v. American Transfer
and Storage Co. 246 the Texas Supreme Court approved the following submit-
ted questions:
Question No. 1
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that defendant,
American Transfer and Storage Company, represented to Plaintiff,
Raymond Brown, that the moving services of American Transfer &
Storage Company would include benefits and characteristics which they
did not include?
Question No. 2
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the representa-
tion or representations inquired about in Special Issue No. 1 was a pro-
ducing cause of any damage to Raymond Brown?
Question No. 3
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that defendant,
American Transfer & Storage Company, represented to Plaintiff, Ray-
mond Brown, that the moving services of American Transfer & Storage
242. 803 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
243. Id. at 734.
244. Id. at 737 (citing Freedom Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Dickinson, 598 S.W.2d 714, 719
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (trial court did not err in refusing
requested issues and instructions where issues were improper or were already included)).
245. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (Vernon 1987).
246. 601 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980).
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Company were of a particular standard, quality or grade, when in fact
they were not?
Question No. 4
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the representa-
tion or representations inquired about in Special Issue No. 3 was a pro-
ducing cause of any damage to Raymond Brown?247
The court emphasized that broad-form submissions were appropriate in
DTPA litigation, stating that while issues in DTPA cases for violations of
section 17.46(b) should be submitted "in terms as close as possible to those
actually used in the statute[,] [t]he language of the statute may be altered
somewhat to conform the issue to the evidence of the case."'248 The broad-
form submission in Brown was proper because the submitted issues followed
closely the wording of the statute with alterations or deletions to conform
the issues to the pleadings and evidence.
Consistent with the mandate of Rule 277 and Texas Supreme Court deci-
sions, it is possible to combine all statutory violations and causation into a
single broad question.2 49 For example, in a suit involving allegations and
proof that an insurer misrepresented the nature of the coverage provided by
a policy purchased by its insured, the following question could be used:
Was any conduct of Insurer a producing cause of damages to Plaintiff?.
Consider the following conduct, if any, and none other:
Representing that its services had characteristics, benefits, or qualities
that it did not have. Representing that its services were of a particular
quality or grade if they were of another.
Representing that the insurance policy involved rights, remedies or obli-
gations that it did not have or involve.
Failing to disclose information about services that was known at the
time of the transaction with the intention to induce another into a
transaction.250
In Holland Mortgage & Investment Corp. v. Bone,251 a case that involved
misrepresentations about the propensity of a house to flood, the court of
appeals approved the following combined liability submission of DTPA sec-
tions 17.46(b)(5) and 17.46(b)(7):
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Hol-
land Mortgage Company represented that the Bone residence:
(a) had characteristics which it did not have, or
(b) was of a particular quality when it was not.252
247. American Transfer & Storage Co. v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 284, 294 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1979), rev'd, 601 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1980).
248. Brown, 601 S.W.2d at 937.
249. See generally David F. Bragg, The Court's Charge in DTPA Cases, 18 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 113, 130-31 (1987); DTPA Pattern Jury Charges, Vol. 4, at L-5.
250. See 4 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 102.01-.05
(1990).
251. 751 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
252. Id. at 518; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE §§ 17.46(b)(5), (7) (Vernon 1987).
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3. Submission of Insurance Bad Faith Cases
a. Two Roads to Recovery
Bad faith claims can be grounded both in the common law duty of good
faith and fair dealing and as a DTPA claim based on violation of article
21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code.253 The damages will vary depending on
which theory is used. Under the DTPA, a plaintiff can get both attorneys'
fees and treble damages.254 In cases where the actual damages are high, a
DTPA claim may result in the largest amount of overall damages. On the
other hand, a successful plaintiff can get exemplary damages under a claim
based on the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing which may
exceed treble damages if actual damages are relatively low.
b. DTPA Grounded Claims
Bad faith claims may fall under the DTPA if they violate article 21.21 of
the Texas Insurance Code. 255 The Texas Supreme Court has held that a
finding that the insured failed to exercise good faith in processing the plain-
tiff's claims supported recovery under article 21.21, section 16 of the Texas
Insurance Code and stated a cause of action for unfair claims settlement
practices under the DTPA.256
The submission of such claims could be accomplished as with other
DTPA claims.257 Thus, it is possible to combine a laundry list of possible
violations into a single broad-form liability question. This question may in-
clude several listed practices in addition to the bad faith claim. For example,
in a suit involving allegations and proof that an insurer violated article 21.21
of the Texas Insurance Code, the following question could be used:
Did the [Insurer] engage in any unfair or deceptive act or practice?
Consider the following conduct, if any, and none other:
Engaging in any false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices.
Making, or directly or indirectly causing to be made, any assertion, rep-
resentation, or statement with respect to insurance that was untrue, de-
ceptive, or misleading.
Not attempting in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable
settlement of a claim when liability has become reasonably clear. 258
c. Common Law Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In the spirit of the E.B. holding,259 it is plausible that the following broad-
253. See Vail v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. 1988) (bad faith
claims may fall under the DTPA); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981).
254. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.50 (Vernon 1987).
255. Vail, 754 S.W.2d at 134.
256, Id. at 135-36; see TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 244-51 for discussion of DTPA claim submissions.
258. See 4 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 102.15, 102.17,
102.20 (1990).
259. Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1990); see supra notes 73-
82 and accompanying text for discussion of E.B..
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form submission would be proper for a claim based on violation of the com-
mon law duty of good faith and fair dealing:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the insurer
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing to the insured by deny-
ing or delaying payment of the claim?
In one opinion, the First District Court of Appeals upheld a similar submis-
sion in a case involving worker's compensation claims.26° The trial court
submitted the following question:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that [Texas Employ-
ers Insurance Association] failed to deal fairly and in good faith when it
denied payment of weekly worker's compensation benefits to Howell
Puckett?26 1
The court of appeals upheld the submission, noting that the question and
related instructions tracked the Texas Supreme Court's language setting
forth the elements of a bad faith claim in Arnold v. National County Mutual
Fire Insurance Co. 262. The Puckett court noted the similarity between the
trial court's submission and the Pattern Jury Charge for good faith and fair
dealing claims in worker's compensation cases. 263 PJC 29.03 provides the
following three liability questions (in addition to questions on proximate
cause and damage submissions) for such cases:
Question No. 1
Did Ace Insurance Company delay the payment of or refuse to pay
compensation benefits to Paul Payne?
Question No. 2
Was there an absence of a reasonable basis for Ace Insurance Company
to deny or delay the payment of compensation benefits to Paul Payne?
Question No. 3
Did Ace Insurance Company know or should it have known that there
was not a reasonable basis for denying the claim or delaying the pay-
ment of compensation benefits? 264
The three PJC questions set out the elements of a good faith and fair dealing
claim delineated by the Texas Supreme Court in Aranda v. Insurance Co. of
North America.265 The Puckett court likewise set out these elements in the
instructions.2 66 The PJC also provides one question that would combine the
three questions with a causation question as follows:
Did Ace Insurance company, when it knew or should have known there
was no reasonable basis to do so, deny or delay the payment of workers'
compensation benefits to Paul Payne, which denial or delay proximately
260. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Puckett, 822 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
261. Id. at 139.
262. Id. at 140; see Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.
1987). See infra text accompanying notes 345-62 for discussion of instructions and elements in
bad faith cases.
263. Puckett, 822 S.W.2d at 139-40.
264. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 29.03 (2d ed. 1992).
265. 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988).
266. Puckett, 822 S.W.2d at 139-40.
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caused damages separate from and independent of the effects of the
damages from the original job-related injury?267
d. The "Stowers Doctrine"
An insurer also has heightened responsibilities to its insured when han-
dling third party claims against the insured. This duty, created in G.A. Stow-
ers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co.,268 and commonly referred to
as the Stowers Doctrine, requires the insurer to act with "that degree of care
and diligence which an ordinary prudent person would exercise in the man-
agement of his own business. '269
In Ranger County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Guin,270 tWO of Ranger's in-
sureds were sued in connection with a car accident. Ranger failed to settle a
third party claim on behalf of the two insureds. A later lawsuit resulted in
damages from the accident that exceeded the amount of the policy by a sig-
nificant amount. The plaintiffs subsequently sued Ranger under the Stowers
Doctrine claiming that Ranger should have settled the claim within the pol-
icy limits.
The trial court submitted the case to the jury based upon the following
special issue:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant
was negligent in the manner in which it handled the claim and lawsuit
asserted against its insureds? 271
Based on this question and related instructions, the majority upheld the
jury's finding that the defendant was negligent in its handling of the third
party claim against the plaintiffs.272
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Gonzalez argued that the submission ex-
ceeded the bounds of the Stowers Doctrine which applies only to "negli-
gence on the part of the [insurer] in failing and refusing to make
settlement. ' 273 Justice Gonzalez contended that the special issue was erro-
neous because it inquired about acts by the defendant other than negligent
failure to settle a lawsuit, including the actual handling of the lawsuit after
the failed settlement, which did not fall under the Stowers Doctrine.274
III. INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFINITIONS
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The Special Issues Act, enacted in 1913, permitted "such explanations and
definitions of legal terms as shall be necessary to enable the jury to properly
267. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATrERN JURY CHARGES PJC 29.03 cmt. (2d ed.
1992).
268. 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved).
269. Id. at 547.
270. 723 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987).
271. Id. at 658.
272. Id. at 660.
273. Id. at 661 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 661-62.
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pass upon and render a verdict on such issues."' 275 This principle of neces-
sity was applied rigorously in an apparent effort to avoid complex jury
charges. 276 Accordingly, since the adoption of the Special Issues Act,277
hostility to the general charge historically has meant a limited role for defini-
tions and instructions. Indeed, before the adoption of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1941, the use of instructions, as distinguished from defini-
tions of legal terms, was prohibited. The most that could be done was to
define legal and technical terms used in the charge. 278
As originally promulgated, Rule 277 was intended to liberalize the use of
instructions by permitting "such explanatory instructions and such defini-
tions of legal terms as shall be necessary to enable the jury to properly pass
upon and render a verdict on such issues."' 279 At that time, language was
also added to provide that an explanatory instruction or definition did not
constitute a general charge. 280 As explained in the following excerpt from
an unpublished memorandum prepared by Justice James McClendon, these
changes were intended to allow trial judges more discretion in the use of
instructions.
I am sure every member of the Committee recognized the inherent right
of every litigant to have his theory of the case (where properly in issue
factually) fairly presented to the jury in some proper and adequate man-
ner. In the respect in question this was amply taken care of by the
provision in Rule 277 ...requiring the judge to give "explanatory
instructions."...
This change from "explanations" in Art. 2189 to "explanatory in-
structions" was intended to reach this objective. "Explanatory instruc-
tions" is also carried into Rules 273, 274, and 276.
Still another objective is attained by this requirement of "Explana-
tory instructions." It combines the special issue and general charge
methods so as to preserve the advantages of both. On the one hand it
obviates subdividing the ultimate, controlling elements of grounds of
recovery or defense into numerous component issues, thereby: 1) sim-
plifying the questions required to be submitted; 2) avoiding confusion;
and 3) obviating conflicting findings and double negatives. On the other
hand, it enables the court to charge the jury understandingly in regard
to the findings they are called upon to make; and at the same time the
275. Act of Mar. 27, 1913, 33d Leg., R.S., ch. 59, § 1, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, repealed
by Act of May 12, 1939, 46th Leg., R.S., Ch. 25, § 1, 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 201.
276. See Texas & N.O. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 32 S.W.2d 363, 366-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1930, writ ref'd); see also J. M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Andrews, 15 S.W.2d 218, 219
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved) (in automobile collision case, instruction as to
duties of drivers approaching and passing other vehicles on public streets was a general charge
and not an explanation and definition of the legal term negligence).
277. Act approved June 18, 1897, 25th Leg., C.S., ch.7, § 1, 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws 15, 15,
10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1441, 1445 (1898).
278. See Texas & N.O.Ry. Co. v. Martin, 32 S.W.2d 363, 366-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1930, writ ref'd). "This assignment does not in the least complain of the court's refusing
or failing to define any term used in [the] charge." Id. at 367.
279. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 as originally promulgated in October, 1940, 3 TEX. B.J. 522
(1940).
280. 3 TEX. B.J. at 567.
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value of the special issue method in requiring specific findings upon the
ultimate, controlling, controverted factual issues in the case is pre-
served. The special issue method, when properly administered, is gen-
erally conceded to be the best adapted to obtaining actual fact findings
by the jury, and to confining the jury to its real proper function - that
of a fact finding instrumentality only. The rule protested combined
with the requirement for "explanatory instructions" will, it is submit-
ted, greatly improve the administration of the special issue method in
this State, preserving, at the same time, every right of the litigant to a
fair submission of his theory of the case.
Nonetheless, continuing hostility to the "general charge" remained a formi-
dable obstacle to the achievement of these goals. 281 Although Justice Mc-
Clendon viewed the change from "explanations" to "explanatory
instructions" as a way to avoid the confusing complexity then existing in the
fragmented Texas "special issue" system by combining a broader form of
special issue as authorized in the original versions of Rules 277 and 278,
with useful explanatory instructions, this view was not shared by all of his
contemporaries. 282 Ultimately, the change had no significant impact on the
practice. Despite the substitution of the words "explanatory instructions"
for "explanations," the 1941 version of Rule 277 permitted them only when
they were "necessary to enable the jury to render a verdict. '28 3
Restrictions on the use of explanatory instructions again were modified in
1973 when Rule 277 was amended by changing the word "necessary" to
"proper. '284 Former Chief Justice Jack Pope, clearly the most influential
figure in the modem development of Texas charge practice in the last
twenty-five years, minimized the significance of this change in a subsequent
law journal article by stating that, "[a]lthough the submission of instructions
has been expanded to give the trial judge more discretion in his use of in-
structions, this discretion is not unfettered. Instructions are limited to those
that should enable the jury to render its verdict. '28 5
Under the current rule, the court is required to submit "such instructions
and definitions as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict. '286
In addition, the last paragraph of Rule 277 gives the following ambiguous
warning:
The court shall not in its charge comment directly on the weight of the
evidence or advise the jury of the effect of their answers, but the court's
charge shall not be objectionable on the ground that it incidentally con-
stitutes a comment on the weight of the evidence or advises the jury of
the effect of their answers when it is properly a part of an instruction or
281. See Boaz v. White's Auto Stores, 172 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. 1943).
282. See J.B. Dooley, The Use of Special Issues Under the New State and Federal Rules, 20
TEX. L. REV. 32, 36-37 (1941).
283. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 as originally promulgated in October, 1940, 3 TEX. B.J. 522, 566-
67 (1940).
284. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 as amended May 5, 1973, eff. Sept. 1, 1973, 36 TEX. B.J. 495,
495-96 (1973).
285. Jack Pope & William G. Lowerre, The State of the Special Verdict - 1979, 11 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1, 39 (1979).




While this paragraph recognizes the tendency of instructions that go beyond
the provision of abstract legal definitions to suggest how jury questions
should be answered, as well as the vice of advising the jury of the effects of
their answers, it does not otherwise resolve the proper role of instructions.
Rule 277's mandate that cases be submitted to the jury by broad-form
questions clearly increases the importance of instructions and definitions to
explain the law, but to an uncertain extent. Chief Justice Pope in his last
published opinion on the subject also predicted the potential problems with
an increased role for instructions and definitions in Lemos v. Montez:288
This court has treated addenda to the charge as impermissible com-
ments that tilt or nudge the jury one way or the other ....
Prior to 1913 there was such a gradual accumulation of instructions
considered helpful to juries, that an errorless charge became almost im-
possible. In 1913, to escape from the unsuccessful general charge, the
Texas Legislature enacted article 1984a. Submission of Special Issues
Act, ch. 59, § 1, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 113. The new procedure re-
quired the use of special issues that would be submitted separately and
distinctly.
In 1973, after sixty years, it became apparent that Texas courts, while
escaping from the voluminous instructions to jurors, had substituted in
the place of instructions, a jury system that was overloaded with granu-
lated issues to the point that jury trials were again ineffective. The
Supreme Court in 1973 amended Rule 277, Tex. R. Civ. P., by abolish-
ing the requirement that issues be submitted distinctly and separately.
Since that time, broad issues have been repeatedly approved by this
Court as the proper method of submission. This court's approval and
adoption of the broad issue submission was not a signal to devise new or
different instructions and definitions. We have learned from history
that the growth and proliferation of both instructions and issues corme
one sentence at a time. For every thrust by the plaintiff for an instruc-
tion or an issue, there comes a parry by the defendant. Once begun, the
instructive aids and balancing issues multiply. Judicial history teaches
that broad issues and accepted definitions suffice and that a workable
jury system demands strict adherence to simplicity in jury charges.289
The proper relationship of instructions and definitions in the charge to
broad-form jury questions is examined in light of the concerns of both Jus-
tice McClendon and Chief Justice Pope.
B. THE NEED FOR APPROPRIATE ACCOMPANYING INSTRUCTIONS
When all civil cases are submitted in one broad-form question, the com-
plexity of the legal inquiry is masked unless adequate instructions and defini-
tions are given. If, for example, the question submitted to the jury is "Did X
defraud Y," the scienter component of fraud is hidden. The question masks
287. Id.
288. 680 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1984).
289. Id. at 801.
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the fact that fraudulent concealment is different from affirmative fraud by
misrepresentation, and from the various forms of constructive fraud. Simi-
larly, in the submission of a number of other types of cases in broad-form,
most of the pertinent information will be in the accompanying definitions
and instructions. It is clearly feasible to construct one broad-form question
in most cases, as long as informative instructions and definitions are in-
cluded in the charge. 29°
C. STANDARDS FOR EXPLANATORY INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFINITIONS
What then is the proper role of explanations and definitions in the context
of mandatory broad-form submission of jury questions? As expressed by the
Texas Supreme Court in Island Recreational:29 1
[w]hen requested, the trial court should submit appropriate accompany-
ing instructions. However, we decline to say that the failure to do so is
reversible error per se. To determine whether an alleged error in the
jury charge is reversible, the reviewing court must consider the plead-
ings and the evidence presented at trial, and the charge in its entirety.292
A number of appellate decisions discuss this subject in more detailed
terms by stating that the trial court is required to define or explain words or
phrases that are given a distinct legal meaning 293 as distinguished from
words having no special legal or technical meaning apart from their ordinary
usage, 294 and by stating that otherwise, explanatory instructions "should be
submitted when, in the sole discretion of the trial courts, they will help the
jury to understand the meaning and effect of the applicable law and pre-
sumptions." 295 As the following paragraphs show, these guidelines are con-
tinuing to evolve.
290. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. John Carlo Texas, Inc., 843 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.
1992) (Trial court's failure to provide the jury with a proper legal definition of an essential
component of the plaintiff's cause of action, i.e. the "intentional" nature of the defendant's
conduct in a tortious interference case, constitutes reversible error).
291. Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Texas Say., 710 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.
1986).
292. Id. at 555.
293. See, e.g., Security Say. Ass'n v. Clifton, 755 S.W.2d 925, 933-34 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1988, no writ) ("At a minimum, however, the trial court must define those words and other
technical phrases that have a distinct legal meaning."); see also First State Bank v. Ake, 606
S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (quoting First State
Bank & Trust Co. v. George, 519 S.W.2d 198, 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) ("The only requirement to be observed is that the trial court must give definitions
of legal and other technical terms.")).
294. See, e.g., Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Combs, 745 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1988, no writ) (words "gross and willful misconduct" as set out in employment con-
tracts held to be words of ordinary meaning needing no definition); see also Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 814 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988) (holding that term "agreement" in tortious interference
with contract case needed no definition).
295. Security Say. Ass'n v. Clifton, 755 S.W.2d 925, 933-34 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no
writ) ("Absent a showing of a denial of a party's rights which was reasonably calculated to
cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper verdict, there is no abuse of discre-
tion."); cf Ahlschlager v. Remington Arms Co., 750 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied) ("[lit is well settled that each party is entitled to an affirmative
submission of all of his theories which have support in the evidence.").
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1. Instruction Must Be Proper
Rule 277 requires the court to submit such instructions as shall be
"proper. ' 296 At the threshold, it must be noted that a definition or an in-
struction is not "proper" unless it is legally accurate. 297 Beyond this simple
beginning point, Texas courts have repeatedly stated that an instruction is
"proper" if it finds support in the evidence and the inferences to be drawn
therefrom; if it might be of some aid or assistance to the jury in answering
the issues submitted; 298 and if it does not improperly comment on the evi-
dence or advise the jury of the effects of their answers. 299
The trial court should exclude anything, no matter how relevant, that
does not aid the jury in answering the questions. 3° Instructions that do not
aid the jury in answering jury questions, no matter how interesting or rele-
vant to the case in a general sense, should be excluded precisely because
these instructions have a tendency to mislead the jury.301
2. General Instruction About Law Is Improper
An instruction must not merely instruct the jury about the general state of
the law regarding who is and who is not liable. 302 An instruction that sim-
ply informs the jury of an abstract principle of law without the jury's knowl-
edge of what bearing it has on the case is not proper.30 3 In Welch, the
compensation insurance carrier requested an instruction to the effect that
evidence of prior compensation payments is not an admission of liability.
The appellate court, in holding that the instruction was properly refused,
pointed out that no question was submitted in the case inquiring as to
whether Texas General was liable.3 4 The requested instruction therefore
could not aid the jury in answering any of the jury questions.30 5
3. Instruction Cannot Be a Comment on the Evidence
An instruction must not be a direct comment on the weight of the evi-
dence. 30 6 In American Bankers Insurance Co. v. Caruth 307 the Dallas Court
296. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
297. Gulf Coast State Bank v. Emenhiser, 562 S.W.2d 449, 453 ('rex. 1978).
298. See, e.g., National Fire Ins. v. Valero Energy Corp., 777 S.W.2d 501, 507 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 822
(Tex. App-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988)
(proper instruction must be legally accurate and assist jury).
299. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277. See infra text accompanying notes 306-35.
300. See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Richard, 536 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pope & Lowerre, supra note 285, at 41.
301. See, e.g., First Int'l Bank v. Roper Co., 686 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1985); Acord v.
General Motors Corp., 669 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Tex. 1984); Fleishman v. Guadiano, 651 S.W.2d
730, 731 (Tex. 1983).
302. See Pope & Lowerre, supra note 285, at 41.
303. Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Welch, 595 S.W.2d 205, 207-08 (Tex. Ciy. App.-Eastland
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
304. Id. at 208.
305. Id.
306. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
307. 786 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
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of Appeals determined that the trial court committed reversible error by
commenting on the weight of the evidence and remanded the case for a new
trial.30 8 The plaintiff sued to collect under an insurance policy covering the
life of a quarterhorse. After a lengthy discovery dispute, the trial court
granted a default judgment against the insurance company as to liability
alone because of discovery abuse, so that the only question for the jury was
the amount of damages.3° 9 The trial court incorporated extensive findings of
fact into the jury charge and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff of
$414,000 under their DTPA cause of action and $5,000,000 in exemplary
damages.310 The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the findings
of fact were an improper comment on the evidence:
An impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence occurs, when
after examining the entire charge, it is determined that the judge as-
sumed the truth of a material controverted fact, or exaggerates, mini-
mizes, or withdraws some pertinent evidence from the jury's
consideration. Lively Exploration Co. v. Valero Transmission Co., 751
S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied). The
comment must also be one that probably caused the rendition of an
improper judgment .... We conclude that the trial court, in this in-
stance, did comment on the weight of the evidence. While ... it is not
error for the trial court, in charging the jury, to assume an uncontro-
verted fact, the trial court, in this case, went beyond simply charging
the jury as to uncontroverted facts. The trial judge made more than
mere incidental comments. We hold that the findings of fact were un-
necessary and impermissible comments on the weight of the evidence
which were calculated to prejudice the rights of American Bankers in
the eyes of the jury. The findings of fact were not designed to be helpful
to the jury in answering any of the questions in the court's charge, and
as evidenced by the trial court's failure to label them as "instructions,"
the findings of fact were not instructive to the jury in answering any of
the questions in the charge. Consequently, we conclude that the trial
court's comments tended to imply to the jury that the trial judge
thought the law and the facts were in favor of Caruth and MJC and that
they should be compensated commensurately. 31'
Although federal law permits the court to sum up the allegations of the
parties and give the judge's view on how the case should be decided under
the evidence, Texas practice does not permit trial judges to suggest to the
jury how the factual disputes in the litigation should be resolved. 3 12 For the
same reason, Texas procedural law precludes a trial judge from marshalling
or summarizing the evidence. 31 3
308. Id. at 435.
309. Id. at 430.
310. Id. at 434.
311. Id. at 434-35 (citation omitted).
312. See Linden-Alimak, Inc. v. McDonald, 745 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1988, writ denied).
313. The Texas Supreme Court specifically disapproved the practice of marshalling in Gulf
Coast State Bank v. Emenhiser, 562 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Tex. 1978), on grounds that the charge
was a comment on the evidence and advised the jurors of the effect of their answers.
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4. Questions and Instructions that "Nudge" or "Tilt" the Jury
Instructions that attempt to impermissibly tilt or nudge the jury toward a
particular result are also improper. 314 In Mitchell v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas
Railroad Co. 315 an FELA case, the plaintiff successfully argued that the fol-
lowing instruction was an improper comment on foreseeability:
In answering this issue, you are instructed that before negligence, if any,
can be established against the Defendant-Railroad, it must be shown
that tl~e Defendant-Railroad, through its officers, agents and/or em-
ployees, knew, or, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known
of an unsafe condition, if any. 316
The Texas Supreme Court reasoned that the instruction was improper be-
cause it "confused the issue of foreseeability relating to duty with the con-
cept of causation" effectively forcing the plaintiff to "prove foreseeability in
order to establish causation, in clear violation of the substantive require-
ments of the FELA." 317 Accordingly, the Court remanded for a new trial,
recommending the use of the Pattern Jury Instructions for FELA cases
adopted by the Judicial Counsel of the Fifth Circuit.
318
A similar problem may be created by the use of inferential rebuttal in-
structions in the charge. For example, in Wisenbarger v. Gonzales Warm
Springs Rehabilitation Hospital Inc.,319 the court of appeals considered
whether an instruction on unavoidable accident could have confused the jury
in a medical malpractice case. 320 The court applied the standard of review
in Acord v. General Motors Corp.321 and Levermann v. Cartal322 to deter-
mine whether the unavoidable accident instruction was an impermissible
comment on the case as a whole that diverted the jury from the real issues in
the litigation. In both of these cases, the additional instructions were deter-
mined to be comments on the entire case, even though the instructions were
legally accurate statements, and harmful error precisely because they had a
tendency to focus the jury on a limitation on the defendants' duty of care in
a misleading manner and because an examination of the entire record indi-
cated that the instructions were reasonably calculated to have misled the
jury. 323 In Wisenbarger, although the court of appeals concluded that there
was no need for the instruction, the court refused to find that it was an
improper comment or harmful to the plaintiff.324
314. See Acord v. General Motors Corp., 669 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Tex. 1984); Lemos v.
Montez, 680 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 1984); Stevens v. Travelers Ins. Co., 563 S.W.2d 223, 226-
29 (Tex. 1978).
315. 786 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896 (1990).
316. Id. at 660.
317. Id. at 663.
318. Id. at 662.
319. 789 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
320. Id. at 693-94.
321. 669 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Tex. 1984) (instruction stated that the defendant was neither the
insurer nor a guarantor of a perfect or accident-proof product).
322. 393 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (instruc-
tion stated that generally a medical doctor is not an insurer or guarantor of his work).
323. Acord, 669 S.W.2d at 116; Levermann, 393 S.W.2d at 935.
324. Wisenbarger, 789 S.W.2d at 694.
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On the other hand, in First International Bank v. Roper,325 a design defect
case grounded in strict tort liability, a legally correct instruction concerning
sole cause that was included within the definition of producing cause and
was neutral in form, was held to be a comment on the weight of the evidence
because it improperly highlighted the manufacturer's defense of parental
negligence. 326 As the Court explained the matter, the sole cause instruction
placed an "undue emphasis on the [parents'] negligence when the jury was
considering the existence of a defect and its relationship to the injurious
event."' 327 But, thereafter in Ahlschlager v. Remington Arms Co.,328 the
court of appeals was confronted with the question of whether a sole cause
instruction was excess baggage as in Roper, or was an appropriate accompa-
nying instruction. 329 The defendant manufacturer defended the case by
claiming that the conduct of a third-party was the sole cause of the accident.
After the court concluded that it was difficult to imagine a stronger case for
giving an instruction on sole cause,330 the court distinguished Roper because
it was tried before the Texas Supreme Court's landmark decision in Duncan
v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 331 Although this distinction is less than completely
convincing, the fact remains that the sole cause defense did not have a ten-
dency to divert the jury from the real issues of the case in Ahlschlager.
Jury questions should be worded so as to avoid assuming the truth of
material controverted facts. 332 In Mooney Aircraft Corp. v. Altman,333 the
Dallas Court of Appeals held that the following questions submitted to the
jury constituted direct comments on the weight of the evidence because they
allowed the jury to assume the existence of material contested facts by im-
proper use of the word "if":
Question 2
If you find the vacuum pump on the aircraft was defective at the time it
left the possession of Mooney Aircraft Corporation, was such defect a
producing cause of the occurrence in question?
Question 3
If you find that the Mooney Aircraft Corporation made false represen-
tations to the public that the aircraft was airworthy, did the representa-
tion about the airworthiness of the aircraft involve a material fact
concerning the character or quality of the aircraft in question which
was relied on by Lawrence Stuart Altman?334
The court stated:
We conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the jury did
325. 686 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1985).
326. Id. at 605.
327. Id. at 604-605.
328. 750 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
329. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
330. Ahschlager, 750 S.W.2d at 835.
331. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984). Duncan enacted a comparative negligence scheme in
Texas for tort actions and arguably abolished the sole cause defense in such cases.
332. Alvarez v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 683 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1984).
333. 772 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
334. Id. at 541.
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think that it was required to assume or suppose the existence of the
disputed facts contained in the questions' introductory "if" clauses.
The questions were phrased so as to lead the jury to believe that it was
assumed that the vacuum pump was defective and that Mooney made
false representations. The jury was not properly asked to find all essen-
tial elements of the Altmans' case. 335
Regardless of whether a comment is "direct" or "incidental," when the
court's charge diverts the jury's attention from the real issues and misleads
them in a way that was reasonably calculated to lead to the rendition of an
improper verdict, reversal should be required. The touchstone of the analy-
sis should be whether the jury was misled by the court's charge, rather than
by slavish adherence to a host of technical rules.
D. THE PROPER ROLE OF INSTRUCTIONS IN "COMPLEX" CASES
1. Instructions in Statutory Negligence Cases
Assume that you represent the plaintiff in a car wreck case premised on
theories of common law negligence and negligence per se. Assuming broad-
form submission of one liability question in addition to the standard defini-
tions of negligence, ordinary care, and proximate cause, are you entitled to
an instruction that advises the jury that the violation of a traffic law is negli-
gence, together with information concerning the requirements of the perti-
nent statute? In Smith v. Central Freight Lines, Inc. ,336 a rear-end collision
case, the court held that a requested "assured clear distance" instruction was
properly refused because it merely restated the standard of ordinary care and
did not alter the common-law duty. 337 When the statutory standard is sub-
sumed under the normal negligence charge, a claimant is not entitled to an
instruction because the statute's standard of care is the same or substantially
the same as ordinary care.338 Under these circumstances, a more "detailed"
charge would be more misleading to the jury than helpful. The corollary is
that if the statute creates some special duty that goes beyond or differs from
the common law duty, the claimant would be entitled to an additional in-
struction. For example, in Caskey v. Bradley 339 a blind pedestrian who was
accompanied by his seeing eye dog was struck by a car, resulting in injury to
the pedestrian. The dog was killed. Instructions based on section 121.00(b)
of the Texas Human Resources Code34° and section 79 of article 6701d 341
were included in the charge to the jury. Accordingly, the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals determined that both statutes created a duty of care different
from the ordinary care standard and held that the instructions were properly
submitted.342
335. Id. at 542.
336. 774 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
337. Id. at 415.
338. Id.
339. 773 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
340. TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 121.00(b) (Vernon 1990).
341. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d § 79 (Vernon 1977).
342. Caskey, 773 S.W.2d at 738.
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2 Instructions in Insurance Bad Faith Cases
a. Definition of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Recent cases have addressed the proper instructions for good faith and
fair dealing claims, despite the fact that the proper definition of the insurer's
duty to the insured in two-party cases is controversial. In Automobile Insur-
ance Co. v. Davila 343 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals approved the fol-
lowing jury instruction:
[T]here is a duty on the part of an insurance company to deal fairly and
in good faith with those persons whom it insures. You are further in-
structed that, in order for the conduct of an insurance company in de-
nying or delaying payment of a claim to constitute a failure to exercise
good faith, it must be shown that the insurer had no reasonable basis for
denying the claim or delaying payment or the insurer failed to deter-
mine whether there was any reasonable basis for the delay. 344
The court reasoned that the instruction was proper because it tracked the
language used by the Texas Supreme Court to define the tort duties of good
faith and fair dealing in Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance
Co. 341 However, it is clear from the majority opinion that the court would
have preferred an instruction that tracked the more detailed description of
these duties that is contained in the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in
Aranda v. Insurance Co. of North America.346
A dissenting justice argued that the failure to include all of the Aranda
elements was grounds for reversal because its definition of the applicable law
was calculated to mislead or to confuse the jury.347 Based on Aranda, the
dissent set forth a more detailed exposition of the elements of the proof re-
quirements for a cause of action for breach of the tort duties of good faith
and fair dealing. The claimant has the burden to establish:
(1) the absence of a reasonable basis for the denial of a claim or the
delay in payment of the benefits of the policy, and
(2) that the carrier: (a) actually knew there was not a reasonable basis
for denial or delay, or (b) should have known, based upon its duty to
investigate, that there was not a reasonable basis for the denial or delay.
Regarding 2(a) and 2(b), whether there is a reasonable basis for denial isjudged by the facts before the insurer at the time the claim is denied.348
Based on this elemental analysis, the dissenting justice reasoned that the in-
struction that was given by the trial judge did not instruct the jury that the
defendant's conduct must be evaluated by considering "the facts before the
insurer at the time of the denial. ' 349 According to the dissent, omission of
this component was grounds for reversal "because the evidence at trial
showed a substantial difference between the information available at the time
343. 805 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
344. Id. at 903.
345. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987); Davila, 805 S.W.2d at 904.
346. 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988); Davila, 805 S.W.2d at 904.
347. Davila, 805 S.W.2d at 911-13 (Benavides, J. dissenting).
348. Id. at 911-12.
349. Id. at 912.
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of the denial and the information available at the time of trial."' 350 The dis-
sent's analysis properly focused on the probable impact of the more abbrevi-
ated definition on the jury's verdict in the light of the case as a whole.
Although the majority disagreed about the probable impact of the instruc-
tion, the method of reasoning used by the dissenting justice is the proper
one. The choice of one "legally correct" definition over another one can
influence the trier of fact. When this influence misleads the jury, reversal is
the appropriate course of action.
Similarly, in Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. Puckett351 the trial
court also instructed the jury by tracking the language used in Arnold.352 In
that case, the trial court provided the following instructions concerning the
duty of a workers' compensation carrier to act in good faith:
You are instructed that a workers' compensation carrier has a duty to
deal fairly and in good faith in its decision to pay or deny worker's
compensation weekly benefits. In order to find that TEIA [Texas Em-
ployers Insurance Association] failed to deal fairly and in good faith in
the payment of workers' compensation benefits, you must find that:
(1) There was not a reasonable basis for a reasonable worker's compen-
sation carrier under the same or similar circumstances to deny weekly
benefits, and
(2) TEIA denied the payment of weekly benefits when
(a) TEIA knew that it had no reasonable basis for denying the claim
or
(b) TEIA failed to determine whether there was any reasonable basis
for such denial.
In this connection, you are instructed that a workers' compensation
carrier has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation in connection
with its decision to pay or deny worker's compensation weekly
benefits. 353
In its opinion the court of appeals explained that the instruction was both a
correct statement of the law according to the Arnold decision and was sub-
stantially similar to the Texas Pattern Jury Charge 29.03 on the same
issue. 354
Nonetheless, TEIA argued that additional language used in the Aranda
opinion should have been included in the jury charge concerning the in-
surer's ability to deny "questionable claims:"
TEIA may deny invalid or questionable claims without breaching its
duty of good faith and fair dealing, even if such denial is erroneous. A
workers' compensation carrier has the right to deny or dispute ques-
tionable claims. In order to find that there was not a reasonable basis
for a denial of workers' compensation weekly benefits where the denial
is based upon the interpretation of medical evidence which requires the
carrier to determine the nature, extent, duration or existence of injury,
350. Id.
351. 822 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
352. 725 S.W.2d 165; Puckett, 822 S.W.2d at 140.
353. Id. at 139-40.
354. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 29.03 (1990).
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disease or disability, the character and quality of the medical evidence
must be such that reasonable minds could not disagree as to its
meaning. 355
As in Davila, the appellate court rejected the carrier's argument that without
the additional instruction, the jury would not know that a carrier is entitled
to some latitude in its decision making process and upheld the trial court's
refusal to submit the instruction on the basis of the trial court's broad discre-
tion with regard to the selection of instructions.3 56 But would it have been
erroneous for the trial judge to have included the additional instruction?
Would the error, if any, have been a basis for reversal of the trial court's
judgment based on a defense verdict? The answers to these questions should
depend upon whether the record demonstrates that the inclusion or exclu-
sion of a requested charge was misleading to the trier of fact, not on rigid
adherence to standard forms.
b. The "Stowers Doctrine"
An insurer also has heightened responsibilities to its insured when han-
dling third party claims against the insured. This duty, created in G.A. Stow-
ers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co.,357 and commonly referred to
as the "Stowers Doctrine," requires the insurer to act with "that degree of
care and diligence which an ordinary prudent person would exercise in the
management of his own business. '358
In Ranger County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Guin 359 the Texas Supreme
Court upheld the following question and related instructions in a "Stowers
Doctrine" case:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant
• ..was negligent in the manner in which it handled the claim and
lawsuit asserted against its insureds? 36
The trial court provided the following definition of negligence:
"Negligence" as used in this special issue means the failure to exercise
that degree of care and diligence which an ordinarily prudent person
would exercise in the management of his own business. If an ordinarily
prudent person in the exercise of ordinary care, as viewed from the
standpoint of the insured, would have settled the case, but the defend-
ant failed or refused to do so, then the defendant is negligent. The duty
to settle implies the duty to negotiate. You are instructed that the De-
fendant ... by the nature of its insurance contract with its insureds...
assumed the responsibility to act as the exclusive and absolute agent of
the insured in all matters pertaining to the questions in litigation and, as
such agent, the Defendant is held to that degree of care and diligence
which an ordinary prudent person would exercise in the management of
his own business .... You are further instructed that under the law of
355. Puckett, 822 S.W.2d at 140.
356. Id.
357. 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved).
358. Id. at 547.
359. 723 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987).
360. Id. at 660.
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Texas, an insurance carrier is required to exercise ordinary care in con-
sidering whether an offer of settlement should be accepted and whether
it should offer the liability limits of its insurance policy but it is not
necessarily a failure to exercise ordinary care merely because its deci-
sion proves to be wrong by reason of a jury verdict; in other words, the
duty to exercise ordinary care leaves room for an error in judgment,
without negligence necessarily resulting therefrom.1 61
Based on these submissions, the majority upheld the jury's finding that the
defendant was negligent in its handling of the third party claim against the
plaintiffs. 362
IV. CONCLUSION
A comparison of the methods of charging the jury used by Texas courts in
this century indicates clearly that the early preference for the use of a gen-
eral charge comprised of instructions and definitions was abandoned in favor
of a charge consisting of separate questions that downplayed the role of in-
structions and definitions. It seems clear that this policy choice was made to
simplify charge practice and to avoid needless reversals of cases that would
be decided essentially the same way when retried. Although there is a pres-
ent-day recognition that complex or slanted instructions and definitions can
and do create serious problems in the administration of justice, there is no
doubt that the historic pattern has been reversed.
Policy decisions made before the conclusion of World War I concerning
the best way to charge juries and the jury's proper role in the adjudicative
process are very nearly opposite from modern Texas Supreme Court deci-
sions on the subject. This reversal in the method of submitting cases has
resulted in problems that must be resolved. One unsettled question of major
consequence to the future development of broad-form submission jury cases
is the appropriate standard of appellate review. Broad-form jury charges
that have a tendency to mislead juries, either because a flawed legal theory is
incorporated into the literal terms of a broad submission or for some defi-
ciency in accompanying definitions and instructions, create real problems in
the administration of justice that cannot sensibly be papered over by adher-
ence to an opaque "abuse of discretion" standard. It is hoped that the analy-
sis of these serious problems identified in this article will serve as a catalyst
for the evolution of Texas charge practice as we approach the twenty-first
century.
361. Id. at 658.
362. Id. at 660.
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